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Abstract 
 
The goal of this project was to provide the Metropolitan Fire Brigade (MFB) with 
evidence based recommendations to improve community resilience activities that 
promote fire safety in the home. MFB Home Fire Safety Campaigns from 2009-2013, 
fire incident data from 2008-2013, and other public safety organisations were analysed. 
Smoking fires, electrical fires, and the presence of a working smoke alarm were isolated 
as potential focuses of future activities. MFB can use the strategies provided to confront 
these issues to create a more resilient community.  
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Executive Summary 
 
Introduction 
An estimated 10,000 residential fires occur every year in Australia.1 In 2012, the state of 
Victoria experienced 3,800 residential structure fires that resulted in over $97 million 
worth of property damage.2  
 
One fire safety campaign conducted by MFB’s Community Resilience Department, in 
partnership with CFA, is the annual Home Fire Safety Campaign (HFSC). This 
campaign runs through the winter months to educate Victorians about the dangers of 
fires in the home.  
 
The goal of this study is to provide MFB with evidence based recommendations to 
improve future community resilience activities in relation to home fire safety. 
 
Methodology 
The project team examined five years of Home Fire Safety Campaigns (HFSCs) from 
2009-13, along with residential structure fire incident data from the Metropolitan District 
of Melbourne during that time. The project delivers: 
1. A comprehensive profile of the Home Fire Safety Campaigns from 2009-
2013. 
2. An analysis of AIRS residential fire incident data for 2008-2013. 
3. Comparison of AIRS data to Home Fire Safety Campaign messages and 
timing. 
4. Suggestions with supporting evidence for best practices in future 
community resilience activities in relation to home fire safety.   
 
To understand the HFSCs, the team analysed and summarised documentation related 
to each of the campaigns from 2009-2013 and conducted interviews with MFB 
personnel.  
 
MFB provided the team with data from the Australian Incident Reporting System (AIRS), 
and we used a range of techniques to analyse all preventable residential structure fires 
between 2008 and 2013. Using AIRS data, we developed a measure of relative severity 
to determine the types of fire that are more severe than average. We also attempted to 
determine if there was any relationship between fire incident trends and of some the key 
messages of the HFSCs.  
 
The team also analysed media releases from MFB to determine the extent that they are 
used to promote home fire safety messages. We researched other public safety 
organisations to find commonalities between successful campaigns. Lastly, the team 
isolated potential home fire safety issues that MFB could focus on in future community 
resilience activities. 
                                            
1 System Planning Corporation (2008) 
2 Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (2014) 
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Results and analysis 
Finding 1: The 2009-2013 Home Fire Safety Campaigns targeted three primary 
home fire safety issues.  
 
The 2009-13 HFSCs all focused on the dangers of unattended cooking and heater fires. 
One of the primary risky behaviours advertised was smoking in bed. 
 
Finding 2: There is no evidence that the HFSC had an effect.  
 
Only about four per cent (n=508) of respondents to an evaluation survey conducted in 
2012 said they undertook a home fire safety activity because they saw a HFSC 
advertisement. From the data analysed by the team, it was not possible to state that the 
HFSCs from 2009 to 2013 had any impact on residential fires during winter. 
 
Our analysis of AIRS data indicates that the distribution of severe fires is not dependent 
upon the season. Fires occurring in the winter months accounted for about 26 per cent 
(2667) of all fires. Fires occurring in the winter months accounted for 24 per cent of total 
dollar loss figures. Winter had the highest percentage of fires confined to their room of 
origin (92.7 per cent), as well as the fewest fires extending beyond their structure of 
origin (12). Fires occurring in the winter comprised 26 per cent (2499) of all first alarm 
fires. 
 
A primary focus of all the HFSCs run since 2009 has been unattended cooking fires. 
The data showed no evidence that the campaigns had an impact on unattended 
cooking fires. The team analysed heater fires because they were a key message in the 
HFSCs. We found that the annual cycle of heater fires had already reached its peak by 
the time the HFSC was broadcast each year. Smoking in bed was another key HFSC 
message. The team was unable to find any evidence in the AIRS data to determine if 
the campaign had an impact of the number of fires resulting from smoking in bed.  
 
Finding 3: Residential structure fires originate from a variety of scenarios that 
vary broadly between frequency and severity. 
 
The team analysed the frequency and severity of fires in terms of area of origin, cause, 
source of energy, appliance, time of day, and presence of a working smoke alarm. We 
found that there is a multitude of ways a fire can start in the home. Few types of fire are 
both frequent and severe, and provide an obvious target for interventions.  
 
Fires are common in the kitchen, structural areas, living areas and the bedroom. 
Although kitchen fires were the most common, they were the second least severe area 
of origin. Of the top five most common fires, those in the structural areas, living areas, 
and bedrooms above average in terms of severity. Cooking related fires, regardless of 
the action that caused them, accounted for 36 per cent (3654) of fires. However, 
cooking related fires also had the lowest relative severity of any cause. 
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The team’s analysis of data related to appliances found that appliances frequently 
started, or were involved in fires. However, of 41 different appliances categorised, there 
were only five that were each responsible for over five per cent of fires.  
 
The distribution of fires, both in terms of frequency and severity, is not uniform across all 
twenty-four hours of the day. Night time was the only period that had a relative severity 
above the average. Our analysis found that fires are more severe when they occur 
between the hours of 11 pm and 7 am. Forty-two per cent (14) of all deaths in our 
dataset occurred during this period. 
 
When the presence of a working smoke alarm is considered, fires that occurred when a 
smoke alarm was not present or failed to operate had the highest relative severity, 
indicating that these fires tend to be the most severe.  
 
Finding 4: The evidence suggests three types of fires that MFB could consider as 
future targets for home fire safety activities. 
 
Based on the evidence we collected, we found that smoking related fires, electrical fires, 
and working smoke alarms were three key areas that MFB could consider as targets for 
future home fire safety activities. 
 
Finding 5: A holistic approach and partnerships were two common features of 
effective public safety activities. 
 
A holistic approach to a public safety issue is one that addresses an identified problem 
on multiple fronts. This can include raising awareness in the community and taking 
actions to improve the physical and social environment. The team found that 
partnerships are useful tool because they allow for the multiplication of resources as 
well as the opportunity to leverage various skillsets that can contribute in different ways 
to addressing the problem.  
 
The team also found that using data and statistics to their full advantage could 
contribute to a better understanding of issues to be targeted. 
 
The team found that MFB media releases related to residential structure fire incidents 
could include a preventative message and a preparedness message. Examination of 
these media releases identified  that these are currently underused and provide 
increased opportunities for MFB to use these existing (and cost-free) communication 
channels to convey home fire safety messages that support the messaging of the 
HFSC. 
 
Finding 6: Effective campaigns tailor messaging based on the desired outcome 
and intended audience. 
 
The team found that effective campaigns tailor public safety messages to a specific 
outcome and audience. We found that to do this, an organisation must conduct 
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research and proactively analyse data. The team’s research of the literature suggested 
that campaigns can be effective when they focus on simple actions, when they target an 
emerging risk, and when safety messages are communicated in ways that are primarily 
entertaining rather than educational. 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
The Home Fire Safety Campaigns from 2009-13 focused primarily on three key 
messages: unattended cooking, heater fires, and smoking in bed. The team found no 
evidence that the campaign was effective at changing people’s behaviour. Neither was 
there evidence that the campaign was effective at reducing the frequency of fires. 
Because there was no evidence of the campaigns making a difference, MFB 
should reconsider how to approach home fire safety issues in the future.  
 
MFB’s current approach to home fire safety could be considered a holistic approach, but 
this could be expanded to include more proactive data collection and analysis, 
partnerships, media relations, multiple communication channels, and a focus on clearly 
defined outcomes.  
 
Proactive data collection and analysis would allow MFB to do five things: identify target 
issues, identify the target audience, develop relevant messages, measure the 
intervention’s success, and determine future courses of action.  
 
Kitchen fires have been addressed in previous HFSCs because they are the most 
frequent fires. Using the relative severity measure developed in this study, the team 
found that kitchen fires were, on average, not severe. The team’s research identified 
three issues that could be future targets for MFB: smoking related fires, electrical fires, 
and working smoke alarms.  
 
Smoking related fires are a significant source of severe fires and fire fatalities and a 
potential target for future community resilience activities. This could include partnerships 
with organisations like VicHealth that focus on reducing the number of smokers in the 
population.  
 
The team’s data analysis revealed that electrical malfunction causes a significant 
number of severe fires. Over half of fires involved electricity, and many fires started from 
electric infrastructure, lights, or fans that malfunctioned. Fires from electrical 
infrastructure tend to be more severe than the average fire as they can burn in hard to 
detect places and spread quickly through the home. MFB could re-establish a 
partnership with Energy Safe Victoria (ESV) and could consider new activities such as 
subsidising and/or promoting the ESV Electrical Home Safety Inspection Program. 
 
The most severe fires occurred in homes without working smoke alarms. The data 
revealed that homes without working smoke alarms had an injury and fatality rate much 
higher than homes with working smoke alarms, and that the fires with the highest 
relative severity occurred when smoke alarms either were not present or did not 
operate. Working smoke alarms are already an issue targeted in the “Change Your 
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Clock, Change Your Smoke Alarm Battery” campaign. However, the team’s data 
analysis revealed that this is an important issue that warrants further consideration by 
MFB.   
 
Behaviour change and risk awareness are complicated fields of psychology, and many 
models have been developed to attempt to explain peoples’ actions and motivations 
with the goal of influencing their behaviour. MFB should consider some of these 
different models in the creation of future campaigns, activities, messages, and 
materials. 
 
MFB could refine the relative severity measures that the team developed in this study.  
Relative severity was a measure that we created to find the most severe fires, and it 
could be used more broadly to help determine major problem areas and make policy 
decisions based upon data. 
 
The AIRS data that the team analysed had several notable limitations. Some of the data 
from AIRS was inaccurate when compared to information written in the description field. 
AIRS does not contain demographic information, making it impossible to track trends 
across the population. These limitations in AIRS may affect MFB’s ability to identify 
emerging risks and the team recommends that MFB consider ways to improve the 
quantity and quality of data.
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1. Introduction 
 
An estimated seven to eight million fires are reported to emergency services throughout 
the world each year. Thirty per cent of these fires originate in a residential structure, 
while the same fires account for eighty per cent of all fire fatalities.3 Unsafe cooking 
practices, dangerous open heat sources, electrical malfunctions, and careless 
behaviours are all contributing factors to residential structure fire ignition. 
 
According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 10,000 residential fires occur every 
year across the country of Australia.4 In 2012, the state of Victoria experienced 3,800 
house fires, resulting in over $97 million worth of property damage.5 The State 
Government of Victoria funds the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board 
(MFB) to protect its community from the dangers of fire. MFB confronts the dangers of 
residential structure fires in both a reactive manner, with operational response, and a 
proactive manner. MFB’s Community Resilience Department runs a multitude of 
community engagement activities designed to properly educate the community and 
raise their awareness of fire safety messages. 
 
MFB is responsible for protecting over 1,200 square kilometres of densely populated 
land.6 Within this area, there are approximately 1.5 million residences under MFB 
protection. This number is expected to rise to more than 2 million in the next two 
decades.7 One activity executed by the Community Resilience Department is the annual 
Home Fire Safety Campaign (HFSC). This campaign, run throughout the winter, targets 
residential fire safety, and is intended to promote safe practices and educate the 
citizens of Victoria to the dangers of residential structure fires. 
 
Since 2010, MFB has contracted third party agencies to evaluate the HFSC. These 
evaluations have provided MFB with insight into one aspect of the campaigns success. 
These evaluations provide only information about Victorian’s recall of the campaigns 
messaging. No connection between campaign messaging and the occurrence of actual 
fire incidents has been examined. Additionally, comprehensive research into best 
practices in the space of community education outside of advertising campaigns has not 
been completed. 
 
The goal of this project was to provide MFB with an evidence based approach to 
community resilience activities in relation to home fire safety. The team combined an 
extensive analysis of fire incident data with research in the community education field to 
provide MFB with evidence for future community resilience activities. The team first 
                                            
3 Brushlinsky et al (2006) 
4 System Planning Corporation (2008) 
5 Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (2014) 
6 Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (2014) 
7 Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (2014) 
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compiled information on the HFSCs implemented from 2009-2013. This information 
supplied the team with a descriptive profile of the campaigns and allowed common 
messaging to be identified. The team then analysed Australian Incident Reporting 
System (AIRS) data, and mapped this data to the profile of the HFSCs to determine the 
relevance of campaign messaging and timing. The data also provided the team with a 
representation of the fire incidents of metropolitan Melbourne and allowed the team to 
identify three potential focuses of future community resilience activities. Finally, the 
team completed research of other public safety organisations as well as existing 
research in the field of public safety to identify effective techniques. The combination of 
fire incident data analysis and public safety research allowed the team to provide MFB 
with an evidence based approach to fostering a safer and more resilient community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
2. Background 
 
This chapter outlines the context in which MFB works. It describes the changing 
demographics of Victoria and the issue of residential structure fires. It contextualises the 
role of MFB by describing the fire and emergency service sector in Victoria. It then 
outlines the role and activities of MFB’s Community Resilience Department. This 
chapter concludes with a review of literature about behaviour change and risk reduction 
communication.  
2.1 Population and Demographics of Victoria 
The state of Victoria covers an area of about 227,000 square kilometres. It has a 
population of approximately 5,768,600 people, which is growing rapidly.8 Population 
projections show that by 2051, Victoria will have 8.7 million people.9 About 31 per cent 
of the population are migrants from other countries. There are about 1.9 million 
households in Victoria, most of which are family homes. As the population of Victoria 
grows, it is also getting older. The median age of 37 in 2011 will rise to 41 by 2051, and 
during that time the population aged 85 and older is projected to quadruple to over 
400,000.6 Additionally, the proportion of family households is projected to decrease 
while the proportion of one-person households increases. Appendix A describes 
common types of housing in Victoria. 
 
Victoria’s main metropolitan centre, Melbourne, covers an area of 7,694 square 
kilometres. Greater Melbourne is home to 4.1 million people, almost 75 per cent of 
Victoria’s population. Melbourne has had the fastest growth rate of any capital city in 
Australia, with an increase of 406,600 people in the five years preceding 2012.10 
Population projections predict that the population of Greater Melbourne will increase to 
6.5 million in 2051, and that this increase will largely be due to overseas migration. With 
this large population increase, the amount of households in Greater Melbourne is 
projected to increase from 1.5 million in 2011, to 2.1 million in 2031. The proportion of 
one-person households is projected to increase by 2 per cent.11   
2.2 Residential Structure Fires in Australia 
Fire service organisations in Australia attended an average of 109,874 incidents each 
year from 2003-2013. As assessed by firefighters, there was an annual average of 
$781.7 million of property loss. Each year, there was an average of 3,325 fire injury 
hospital admissions as well as 107 fire related deaths.12 
 
                                            
8 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2014) 
9 Department of Planning and Community Development (2012) p. 3 
10 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013) 
11 Department of Planning and Community Development (2012) p. 8 
12 Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision (2014) 
Deaths from smoke, fire and flames due to exposure or undetermined intent. Deaths due to intentional 
self-harm and assault have been excluded. All locations and types of fire have been included,  
not just domestic fires. The list includes landscape fires (e.g. bushfires). The 2009 results include 178 
people killed in the Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria 
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Specific groups within the population are more likely to cause a fire, and are more 
susceptible to injury or fatality. According to the Australasian Fire and Emergency 
Service Authorities Council (AFAC), the following demographic groups have an 
increased chance of injury or death in a residential structure fire. 
• People aged 65 years and older 
• Children aged between 0-4 years 
• Adults affected by alcohol consumption 
• Males 
• Adults aged 20-44 years 
• People of low socio-economic status 
• People with poor educational background 
• Ethnic minorities 
• Individuals who smoke 13 
 
In the state of Victoria, from 2003-2013, there was an average of 23,067 incidents 
attended by fire service organisations each year. There was an annual average of 
$213.2 million of property loss, an average of 659 fire injury hospital admissions, and 39 
fire related deaths.14 Appendix B provides a brief background of residential structure 
fires with a focus on the United States. 
2.3 Fire Services in Victoria 
The fire and emergency management sector in Victoria is comprised of the Metropolitan 
Fire Brigade (MFB), Country Fire Authority (CFA), State Emergency Service (SES), 
Land, Fire and Environment Group – Department of Environment and Primary 
Industries (DEPI). These agencies are overseen by the Emergency Management 
Commissioner and his office, Emergency Management Victoria (EMV). The sector has 
adopted a common vision of “A safer and more resilient community”.15 Other 
emergency services such as Victoria Police and Ambulance Victoria reside outside the 
EMV framework, but all agencies work closely together. 
 
MFB provides firefighting, emergency medical response, rescue, urban search and 
rescue, road rescue, marine rescue, and hazardous material incident response services 
to the Metropolitan District (MD) of Melbourne. The MD covers an area of more than 
1,200 square kilometres. MFB protects almost four million Melbourne residents, 
workers, and visitors, as well as billions of dollars of assets and infrastructure. All MFB 
firefighters are full time employees. MFB’s rank structure is located in Appendix C. 
Firefighters respond out of 47 fire stations throughout the Metropolitan District shown in 
Figure 1.16 
                                            
13 Australasian Fire Authorities Council (2005) pp. 3-4 
14 Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision (2014) 
Deaths from smoke, fire and flames due to exposure or undetermined intent. Deaths due to intentional 
self-harm and assault have been excluded. All locations and types of fire have been included, not just 
domestic fires. The list includes landscape fires (e.g. bushfires). The 2009 results include 178 people 
killed in the Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria. 
15 Fire Services Commissioner Victoria (2012) 
16 Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (2014) 
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Figure 1 - MFB Coverage Regions17 
 
CFA is comprised of 1,126 brigades that are responsible for the areas of Victoria that lie 
outside of the Metropolitan District. CFA firefighters are primarily volunteers, but there 
are career firefighters based in Melbourne’s outer suburbs, regional cities and large 
towns. Like MFB, CFA provides a range of emergency response services. Appendix D 
shows CFA’s areas of coverage.18 
 
                                            
17 Map was provided by MFB Strategic Analysis and Reporting Unit 
18 Country Fire Authority (2014) 
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SES is a volunteer based organisation. It is the control agency during natural disasters 
such as floods and earthquakes, and the agency primarily responsible for road rescue 
in Victoria. It also assists in search and rescue activities and major bushfire incidents.19  
 
DEPI’s primary focus is on protecting the environment, and fire prevention and 
firefighting activities on public land is a small part of that. Most DEPI firefighters work on 
a seasonal basis.20 The DEPI areas of coverage are located in Appendix D. 
2.4 MFB Community Resilience Department 
Improvements in fire safety are a result of MFB’s emergency response and community 
resilience activities. MFB’s Community Resilience Department uses a variety of 
approaches to achieve the goal of “A safer and more resilient community”. The 
Community Resilience Strategy focuses on three key strategies: building stronger 
communities, making firefighters safer, and working in partnership with other 
organisations for the best possible outcome.21  
 
The range of activities and approaches used by Community Resilience include:  
• Research 
• Development of strategies, treatments, polices and messaging 
• Program development and delivery (Fire Ed for Prep, Fire Ed For Upper Primary, 
Seniors Fire Safety, Flames)  
• Advocacy and lobbying for improved safety outcomes via external frameworks 
(inclusion of home fire safety information in qualifications) for community care 
workers, and legislation (legislation requiring all homes to have a smoke alarm) 
• Workplace Emergency Management and safety advice for business and industry 
• Participation in state and local events such as fairs, festivals, etc. 
• Campaigns 
 
Community Resilience, in partnership with CFA, develops and delivers an annual cycle 
of advertising campaigns. CFA leads the Summer Fire Safety Campaign to increase 
preparedness and knowledge about bushfires. The Change Your Clock Change Your 
Smoke Alarm Battery campaign runs shortly after the end of the bushfire season to 
coincide with the end of daylight savings. This is a national campaign based on a 
partnership between fire services from other states and territories and Duracell, a 
consumer battery company, to promote the importance of a working smoke alarm.  
 
MFB leads the annual Home Fire Safety Campaign that is the focus of this paper. 
2.5 Literature Review 
This section outlines a review of literature conducted by the team. The aim of the 
literature review was to discover background information to help inform and interpret the 
findings of this project. In the first two weeks of the study, the team created a list of 
keywords and phrases. The team then used Google Scholar and MFB’s library 
                                            
19 Victoria State Emergency Service (2014) 
20 Department of Environment and Primary Industries (2014) 
21 Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (2013) p. 2 
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catalogue to find relevant information based on these keywords. The team read and 
discussed each article to determine relevant information for the literature review.  
 
2.5.1 Perception of Risk from Fire 
Many people have the attitude that fires will not happen to them22 and as such, are not 
concerned about fire safety in their own homes.23 Being prepared for a fire by having a 
working smoke alarm can make people less likely to think that their family would be hurt 
in a fire or that house fires are a serious problem.24, 25 People generally underestimate 
the dangers of fire, having a higher perception of risk in buildings that are not their own 
home, even though risk of injury or fatality is greater in their own home. People often 
underestimate the danger of fire, because they do not realise that smoke, not heat, 
causes an estimated 90 to 95 per cent of deaths.26   
 
Most people who have experienced a fire say that it could easily have been 
prevented.27 However, Hooper (2003) found that most respondents to a survey viewed 
home safety “in terms of how to react to a fire, rather than how to prevent it.” The same 
study found that of people who had a fire in their home, “only 64 per cent stated that the 
risk of fire was worth making the home more fire safe.”28   
 
In terms of fire safety communication, research has shown that there is a need to 
highlight both how and why fire is a danger to the community. 29 Organisations should 
take believability, personal relevance, and significance into account when 
communicating safety messages.30 Research has found that losing one’s home or 
possessions is the most believable consequence of a fire, while death is not a 
believable consequence of fire and serious burns are seen as highly unlikely.31  
 
Fire risk and prevention is a complex issue because fires can start in many different 
ways. The “wicked problem” approach suggests that it is not effective to attempt to 
solve problems that involve complex social factors by focusing on a single cause.32 
Simpson et al (2013) conducted research into children’s injuries; many of the principles 
from this research apply to home fire safety. There are complex and interactive contexts 
in which events occur, so it is hard to focus on the prevention of injury (or fire) as there 
are so many complex causes. 33 However, it is important to identify what common 
issues can be addressed while recognising that unintentional events will still occur.34  
 
                                            
22 Bird et al (2011) p. 4 
23 Litmus (2013) p. 6 
24 Parker (2013) p. 608 
25 Hooper (2003) p. 29 
26 Hooper (2003) p. 27 
27 Research International (2011) p. 15  
28 Hooper (2003) p. 29 
29 Hooper, 2003, p. 29 
30 Research International (2011) p. 48 
31 Research International (2011) p. 39-41 
32 Simpson et al (2013) p. 1649 
33 Simpson et al (2013) p. 1647 
34 Simpson et al (2013) p. 1652 
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2.5.2 Theory, Complexity, and Models of Behaviour Change 
Often the research process makes too many assumptions and over-simplifies the social 
world in which we live.35 Sociological perspectives characterise people as “predictably 
irrational, sometimes rational, cultural and social animals.” 36 This characterisation 
underlines the complexities faced by organisations attempting to change behaviour in a 
community.  
 
A fundamental notion in behaviour change theory is that one of the strongest motivators 
of behaviour change is emotion. This is supported by the theory that likely triggers to 
behaviour change are major life events, whether they are celebratory or 
mournful.37,38,39,40 Additionally, research shows that the responsibility for a consequence 
is a primary emotional driver of behaviour change. 41  
 
To effectively influence behaviour change, public safety organisations must overcome a 
wide range of behavioural factors. Some of these factors include: 
• The difficulty in overcoming an ingrained habit42,43 ,44 
• The differing capacity of people to make good choices 
• The need of good choices to be attractive, available, and affordable 
• The importance of social norms in shaping an individual’s choice45 
 
People do not instantly adopt safety messages. Instead, behaviour change has various 
stages of contemplation, preparation, action, and confirmation.46 One model that 
attempts to provide a framework to address each of these stages is the social marketing 
model. This model, summarised in Figure 2, outlines four steps that social marketing 
must accomplish to successfully influence behaviour change.47 
 
Figure 2 - Social Marketing Model 
                                            
35 Lloyd and Roen (2001), p. 7 
36 Fuller (2010) p. 5 
37 Research  International (2010) 
38 Litmus Limited (2014) 
39 Baum (2004) p. 17 
40 Bird et al, p. 1 
41 Research International (2011) p. 52 
42 Fuller (2010) p. 5 
43 Bird et al, Page 3 
44 Fuller (2010) p. 5 
45 Fuller (2010) p. 5 
46 Hooper (2003) p. 29 
47 Martin Jenkins (2012) p. 2 
Raising awareness Changing peoples' views Changing peoples' behavior Maintaining behavioural change 
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Individuals’ attitudes towards what is required, their ability to perform what is required, 
and their understanding of why it is required all contribute to whether or not the 
maintenance or confirmation stage is reached. 48,49 Another model, called the Health 
Belief Model, describes the factors that affect an individual’s perceptions towards 
preventative behaviour change. These factors are: 
• Perceived susceptibility 
• Perceived severity 
• Perceived benefits of performing the preventative behaviour 
• Perceived barriers to performing the preventative behaviour 
• Cues to action 
• Self-efficacy (belief in one’s own ability to perform preventative behaviour) 50 
2.5.3 Holistic Approach to Public Safety Communication 
Fuller (2010) argues that an advertising mindset is easy for government agencies to 
adopt, but that a more comprehensive view incorporating knowledge about human 
behaviour is needed.51 A holistic approach to public safety includes various activities 
that work in conjunction to address a public safety issue. Research has found that, “fire 
prevention and response education is most effective if it is community-based, 
continuous, and uses a range of strategies.” 52  
 
The Haddon Matrix is useful to demonstrate the array of potential measures available to 
public safety organisations. It was originally developed in the context of traffic accident 
prevention, but has been applied to many other injury prevention situations. The 
Haddon Matrix combines the concept of host, agent, and environment as targets of 
intervention with the concept of primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. 53 The most 
appropriate application of the matrix is to identify multiple prevention measures for a 
single problem. Table 1 provides an example of the Haddon Matrix applied to the 
problem of unattended cooking fires.54   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                            
48 Martin Jenkins (2012) p. 14 
49 Hooper (2003) p. 29 
50 Parker et. al (2013) p. 600 
51 Fuller (2010), p. 4 
52 New Zealand Council for Education Research (2000) 
53 Haddon (1980) 
54 Adapted from Runyan (1998) 
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Table 1 - Haddon Matrix 
 
Host 
(the cook) 
Agent 
(stove top, 
cooking utensils, 
food) 
Physical 
environment 
(kitchen) 
Social 
environment 
(community 
norms, rules) 
Pre-event 
(before the fire 
starts) 
• Teach safe 
cooking 
practices 
• Pay attention 
• Improve 
appliance safety 
(e.g. automatic 
shutoff) 
• Maintenance of 
cooking 
appliances 
• Lower 
flammability of 
surrounding 
structures 
 
• Improve efforts 
to encourage 
safe cooking 
Event (during 
the fire) 
• Knowledge of 
home escape 
plans 
• Fire safety 
training 
(appropriate use 
of fire blankets 
and 
extinguishers) 
• Design appliance 
with safety 
systems 
• Reduce 
flammability of 
materials 
• Presence of 
working smoke 
alarms/ 
sprinklers 
• Ease of 
access to fire 
extinguisher 
and blanket 
• Legislate for 
smoke alarms 
and sprinklers 
• Ensure 
adequate fire 
service 
response 
Post-event 
(after the fire) 
• Knowledge of 
first aid 
 
• Ensure safe 
operation of 
appliances 
• Rebuild 
kitchens with 
less toxic 
materials 
• Adequate 
support 
• Insurance 
coverage 
• Raise 
awareness 
 
The Haddon Matrix illustrates that a safety issue can be addressed in multiple ways.  
2.5.4 Simplification of Messaging 
Due to the complexity of behaviour change, an intervention is more likely to be 
successful if the targeted behaviour for change is a single action rather than a habit.55 It 
is more beneficial to provide people with specific, actionable messages than to overload 
them with multiple messages.56 A person will be more likely to change their behaviour if 
they can make a series of small changes.57 Because of this, education for behaviour 
change should focus on simple and achievable steps with clear outcomes.58 People 
want to know what to do in certain situations, not just to know that some things are 
risky. 59 As such, it is important, and more effective, to instruct people with pertinent 
messages detailing specific actions to take and describing how to perform those 
actions.60  
                                            
55 Wakefield et al. (2010) p.1268 
56 NZCER (2000) 
57 UK Department of Health (2011) 
58 NZCER (2000) 
59 Ross (2012) p. 22 
60 TNS (2006) 
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2.5.5 Communication Channels 
There are many ways to communicate safety information to the public. Television is a 
favoured and effective means of communicating safety messages. In the context of 
online communication, research is consistent in supporting that users prefer entertaining 
content to instructional/educational content on social media websites.61 Localised, 
personally relevant, and funny information is useful to keep the audience interested.62 
Lister et al (2013) found that entertaining videos have greater potential to have a public 
health impact than educational videos. They propose the Laugh Model in which public 
health videos are primarily entertaining, with discreet health messages.63 Through any 
channel of communication, humour,64,65 stories, and visualisation of scenarios are 
effective ways to communicate messages.66 
 
2.5.6 Difficulties of Measuring Success in Public Education 
Programs and activities conducted by public safety organisations need a specific goal, 
with appropriate measures of success directly linked to this goal.67 It is important to 
invest in research to discover what is occurring and how best to address risks.68 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to evaluate the success of a program because there are a 
variety of internal and external factors that can affect its success. Programs can have 
an accumulated effect over time, more than one program may be running at once, and 
wider social influences may exist. It is not always possible to link changes specifically 
back to the programs.69 Appendix E provides a description of public safety campaign 
evaluation methods.  
 
2.5.7 Risk Reduction Through Harm Avoidance 
Public safety organisations handle the reduction of risk differently. One framework of 
risk reduction is the harm avoidance model. This model focuses on the reduction of risk 
levels, rather than the reduction of risks themselves. 70  
 
Malcolm Sparrow summarises why a harm avoidance model is beneficial to public 
safety organisations:  
 
Regulatory agencies should not feel obligated to prove causality. They should be 
content to demonstrate publicly their ability to focus on specific risks, to design 
and implement creative solutions, and to determine when the risk has abated 
sufficiently to permit them to move onto other priorities. A substantial collection of 
problem-solving success stories, accumulated over time, none of them claiming 
                                            
61 Lister et al (2013) 
62 Ross (2012) p. 68-73 
63 Lister et. al (2013) 
64 TNS (2006) 
65 Lloyd et. al (2001) p. 3 
66 Lloyd and Roen (2001), p. 3 
67 Martin Jenkins (2012) p. 5 
68 Martin Jenkins (2012) p. 14 
69 Martin Jenkins (2012) p. 7 
70 Martin Jenkins (2012) p. 29 
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causality, constitutes a compelling public account of intelligent resource 
allocation and agency effectiveness.71 
 
In the application of the harm avoidance model, emerging risks are identified and 
interventions are enacted to reduce the level of risk. A successful adoption of this 
principle requires proactive monitoring of data, allowing the early identification of 
emerging risks and the application of a successful intervention. 72 
 
  
                                            
71 Sparrow (2008) 
72 Martin Jenkins (2012) p. 29 
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3. Methodology 
 
The goal of this project was to provide MFB with evidence based recommendations to 
improve future community resilience activities in relation to home fire safety. The project 
team examined five years of Home Fire Safety Campaigns (HFSCs) from 2009-13, 
along with residential structure fire incident data from the Metropolitan District of 
Melbourne during that time. This project provides: 
1. A comprehensive profile of Home Fire Safety Campaigns from 2009-13 
2. An analysis of Australian Incident Reporting System (AIRS) residential fire 
incident data for 2008-13 
3. A comparison of AIRS data to Home Fire Safety Campaign messages and 
timing 
4. Suggestions with supporting evidence for best practices in future 
community resilience activities in relation to home fire safety 
 
The project methodology follows the five steps shown in Figure 3. Each of these steps 
is described in more detail in this chapter.  
 
 
Figure 3 - Methodology Flowchart 
 
3.5 Isolate Potential Home Fire Safety Issues 
Isolate fire scenarios which were both relatively 
common and severe 
Consider scenarios which can be addressed in 
multiple manners 
3.4 Examine Other Safety Organisations for Alternative Strategies  
Research other organisations with public  safety 
activities 
Gather examples of other practices that can be 
applied to home fire safety 
3.3 Compare Data to the Home Fire Safety Campaigns 
Create timeline comparing fire incident data to 
campaign messages/timing Examine media releases for campaign messages 
3.2 Examine Fire Incident Data 
Analyse data with Grounded 
Theory methods 
Analyse data in terms of 
frequency 
Analyse data in terms of 
severity 
3.1 Analyse 2009-2013 Home Fire Safety Campaigns  
Compile characteristics of each 
campaign 
Compile existing third-party 
evaluations Interview MFB personnel  
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3.1 Analysis of Home Fire Safety Campaigns  
The project team analysed each of the HFSCs from the past five years to create a 
frame of reference to compare with residential structure fire incident data. The team 
conducted interviews with MFB personnel in addition to a review of all documentation to 
develop a profile of the past five campaigns. The team analysed the eight campaign 
components described in  
Table 2. 
 
Table 2 - HFSC Aspects 
Component Description 
Budget Total amount of money spent on each campaign 
Campaign Duration Start and end dates 
Target Demographics The audience that the campaigns intended to reach  
Partnership Organizations Companies that helped develop and run the campaigns 
Themes Main messages and slogans of each campaign 
Advertisement Strategy Types of media used in campaign material 
dissemination 
MFB Community Level Involvement Interaction of MFB personnel with community members 
Third-Party Evaluations Campaign evaluations completed by outside agencies 
 
The team examined the financial records of each campaign to answer the following 
questions: 
• How much money was spent on each campaign? 
• How was the money distributed between the campaigns’ functions? 
• What difference exists between the budgets of the five campaigns?  
 
The team documented the duration of the campaigns to understand: 
• When the campaigns were run, 
• If the campaigns began or ended during a transition period between seasons.  
 
To determine the advertising strategy of the campaigns, the team examined the 
campaign materials and the media outlets used to broadcast and promote the 
campaign. The campaign materials included newspaper and radio advertisements, 
posters, and online advertisements. The team inspected these materials in order to 
determine: 
• What was the primary theme(s) for each campaign? 
• What were the major issues targeted? 
• What were the key messages? 
 
To fill in gaps in the information available from campaign records, the team conducted 
semi-structured interviews with MFB personnel. The personnel included the past and 
current directors of the Home Fire Safety Campaign, Commander Frank Stockton and 
Commander John Rampling (Manager Public Education), and MFB Community 
Engagement Strategist, Marc Florio. The list of interview questions is in Appendix F. 
 
The team examined third-party evaluations of the campaigns from 2010 through 2013. 
The evaluations included data on the “reach” of different types of media. Reach data 
15 
 
provides an estimate of the number and demographics of people who saw 
advertisements. Independent surveys conducted in 2012 and 2013 provided information 
about the effectiveness of the campaign messages in changing behaviour.  
 
The team compiled and analysed this data in order to highlight the differences between 
the campaigns in terms of these variables. This consolidation allowed the team to 
compare and contrast the different campaigns, as well as to compare the campaigns to 
fire incident data.  
3.2 Examination of Fire Incident Data  
Most fire services in Australia use AIRS for recording and reporting information about 
emergency events. Any incident that MFB turns out to (not just fires, but also other 
types of incident such as rescue, hazardous material incident, or false alarm) is 
recorded in the AIRS database. Incident controllers – usually firefighters of station 
officer or senior station officer rank – use a web interface to complete an incident report 
that consists of a mixture of mandatory and optional fields. Some information is pre-
filled using data generated from another system, FireCom, at the time of the incident. 
One field in AIRS that is of particular importance to this study is the description field. 
This free text field gives the incident controller a chance to provide additional details 
about the incident that could otherwise go unrecorded. 
  
MFB provided the team with an extraction from the AIRS database that comprised all 
attended residential structure fire incidents (excluding suspicious fires) in the 
Metropolitan District for the period 2008-13. Appendix G contains a list of the data fields 
provided. 
 
3.2.1 Time of Year 
The team analysed the data based on the time of year in which fires occurred. The 
dates for Australia’s seasons are: 
Spring: 1 September – 30 November 
Summer: 1 December – 28 February 
Autumn: 1 March – 31 May 
Winter: 1 June – 31 August 
 
The team used the following process for the analysis: 
1. Isolate fires occurring in each month for the six years and calculate monthly 
totals, yearly totals, average amount of fires per month, and percentage of all 
fires occurring in each month. 
2. Organise fire into seasons and calculate seasonal totals, average number of 
fires per season, and percentage of all fires occurring in each season using 
monthly data. 
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3.2.2 Area of Origin 
To compile the various areas within residential structures in which fires originated, the 
team organized the data into easily understandable groups. There were originally 60 
areas of origin represented within the data set. We compiled them into the following 
groupings that correspond to the areas of a typical residence: 
• Kitchen • Storage Areas 
• Bedroom • Garage 
• Living Area • Outside Areas 
• Connecting Areas • Structural Areas 
• Facilities • Other 
• Utility Areas • Unknown 
 
3.2.3 Grounded Theory Analysis of AIRS Data 
Grounded Theory is a model typically used in social research to dynamically identify 
trends in qualitative data.73 The team used Grounded Theory to categorise fires by 
analysing the qualitative data contained within the description section of AIRS. We 
developed a system for classifying each individual fire further by creating five additional 
fields for the dataset. Table 3 contains the new fields and a sample of their contents. 
 
Table 3 - AIRS Analysis Categories 
 
Significance 
In many cases, the incidents recorded in AIRS were insignificant. The team coded an 
incident as insignificant if a fire did not actually occur (e.g. a smoke alarm operating due 
to burnt toast) or if there was no substantial response by MFB (e.g. self-extinguished 
burnt foodstuffs). Any incident where the occupant was not at home or incapable of 
response (asleep or impaired) was deemed significant regardless of how 
inconsequential the fire was.  
 
Significance was a useful tool for the team to identify fires that were particularly frequent 
but not necessarily severe. The team later disregarded the significance field in 
comparative analysis, replacing it with the more encompassing relative severity 
measure explained in Section 3.2.5. 
 
  
                                            
73 Denscombe (2008) p. 88 
Field Sample Content 
Cooking Related Yes/No 
Source of Energy Gas/Electric/Open Flame/Cigarette/Other/Unknown 
Cause Mechanical Failure/Improper Use/Not Paying Attention/Other/Unknown 
Insignificant Yes/No 
Appliance Various Appliances (e.g. Stove, Fan, etc.) 
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Cause 
The team isolated five major causes as the reason for a fire. These causes are: 
• Cooking: A fire that occurred during the process of cooking. 
• Mechanical Failure: A fire that was caused by the failure of an appliance 
regardless of nature (e.g. electrical or mechanical) as well as failures due to a 
lack of maintenance and improper installation. 
• Improper Use: A fire that resulted from the incorrect use of an appliance or 
object. 
• Not Paying Attention: A fire that were caused by a lack of attention, primarily a 
lack of attention to a heat source (e.g. stove, candle, etc.) 
• Other: Fires that could not be classified into the above groupings, e.g. accidents. 
• Unknown: Fires that did not have sufficient data available to classify. 
 
The team then further analysed kitchen fires by using the incident description field to 
attempt to classify the human behaviours associated with kitchen fires in the not paying 
attention category. We created four subsections of this cause: 
• Unattended: A fire that began while someone was distracted but at home. 
• Left House: A fire that began after people left their home. 
• Falling Asleep: A fire that began after people went to sleep for the night or dozed 
off inadvertently.  
• Impaired: A fire that began following people not paying attention due to a 
physical, mental, or other impairment such as drugs or alcohol. 
Source of Energy 
The team classified six primary sources of energy. These sources are: 
• Electric 
• Gas 
• Open Flame 
• Cigarette 
• Other 
• Unknown 
Appliance 
Forty-one separate appliances were isolated in the analysis of the data. The ten most 
common appliances are: 
• Stove 
• Cigarette 
• Heater 
• Oven 
• Electric Infrastructure 
• Light 
• Toaster 
• Microwave 
• Candle 
• Fan 
 
The team defined electric infrastructure as anything that brought power to another 
appliance (wiring, powerpoints, powerboards, etc.) The full list of 41 appliances is 
located in Appendix H. 
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3.2.4 Casualties from Residential Structure Fires 
Fires have the potential to be a threat to human life. Preventing fires from claiming 
casualties is a vital aspect of building a safer and more resilient community. 
 
Fatalities 
MFB’s Fire Investigation Unit provided the team with data about all fatalities within the 
Metropolitan District from 2008-13. The team excluded fatalities that were a result of 
homicide or suicide from the data set to isolate preventable residential fire fatalities. The 
team then grouped fatal fires by cause. A note was made if the victim was either aged 
65+ or under the influence of alcohol or other drugs.  
Injuries 
The team used AIRS data to obtain injury statistics for all residential structure fires. We 
organised the fires by the number of injuries they caused. In addition to AIRS data, MFB 
also collects data from the Victorian Injury Surveillance Unit (VISU). A sample of VISU 
data from 2011 contains 184 hospital admissions and 170 hospital presentations for fire 
related injuries in the Metropolitan District. Of both admissions and presentations, adults 
aged 20-39 years comprised the majority. Unintentional actions caused 85 per cent of 
all admissions and 88 per cent of all presentations.74 Due to the general nature of the 
VISU injury data, the team could not link individual injuries to AIRS incident data. 
 
3.2.5 Severity 
The team attempted to develop a measure of the severity and rate of recurrence of 
fires, so that different types of fires could be analysed in terms of both their frequency 
and severity. The team found that the estimated dollar loss, extent of flame damage, 
and alarm level fields from AIRS approximated the top 5, 10, and 20 per cent of fires in 
terms of severity. The team also explored the option of including injury and fatality data 
as severity measures, but these were disregarded due to the small sample size of these 
fields. 
 
The team examined data from the three fields alongside one another in order to 
establish a basis with which to classify an individual fire as severe. The criteria were 
also compared against one another to confirm that they were internally consistent; this 
comparison is located in Appendix I. 
Estimated Dollar Loss 
The team used the AIRS field Estimated Dollar Loss to obtain cost statistics on the fires. 
The estimated dollar loss is a value determined on scene at the time of the incident by 
the incident controller. This value, while an estimate, provides an indication of the 
destructiveness of the fire. The team separated fires into dollar loss brackets to 
establish levels of severity in terms of dollar loss. The brackets and the number of fires 
contained in each bracket for the entire time period are located in Table 4. 
 
 
                                            
74 Victorian Injury Surveillance Unit (2013) 
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Table 4 - Estimated Dollar Loss Distribution 
Est. Dollar Loss  # of Fires % of Fires Est. Dollar Loss  # of Fires % of Fires 
<$100 3443 34.0% $50k-100k 241 2.4% 
$100-1k 2527 25.0% $100k-250k 259 2.6% 
$1k-$5k 2125 21.0% $250k-500k 135 1.3% 
$5k-$10k 545 5.4% $500k-1m 50 0.5% 
$10k-50k 779 7.7% $1m+ 8 0.1% 
Severe Total  # of Fires: 2017              % of Fires: 19.9%  
 
Fires above $5,000 in damage comprise 19.9 per cent (2017) of fires. 
Extent of Flame Damage 
The team used the AIRS field Extent of Flame Damage to obtain statistics on the 
containment of fires. Extent of flame damage is an important measure of success of 
firefighting operations. MFB aims to contain 90 per cent of all fires to the room of origin, 
and MFB reports this key performance indicator to government annually. We used fires 
that spread past their room of origin as a second measure to determine fire severity. 
The AIRS categories for extent of flame damage and the numbers of fires within each 
category are located in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 - Extent of Flame Damage Distribution 
Extent of Flame Damage # of Fires % of Fires 
No damage of this type. 910 9.0% 
Confined to the object of origin. 5705 56.4% 
Confined to part of room or area of origin. 1904 18.8% 
Confined to room of origin 658 6.5% 
Confined to floor of origin. 193 1.9% 
Confined to structure of origin. 510 5.0% 
Extended beyond structure of origin. 111 1.1% 
Unclassified 121 1.2% 
Severe Total 814 8.0% 
 
Fires extending beyond the room of origin comprised the worst eight per cent (814) of 
fires. 
Alarm Level 
The team used the AIRS field Alarm Level to determine MFB’s weight of response to 
residential fires. When MFB receives a call, the incident is automatically classified as a 
first alarm fire. The on-scene incident controller determines if the personnel and 
equipment dispatched at alarm level one can suppress the fire. Should the incident 
controller require additional resources to suppress the fire, either individual resources 
can be requested, or the alarm level can be raised, triggering the dispatch of an 
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additional suite of fire appliances and other resources to the incident. The number of 
fires reaching each alarm level during the period of the study are located in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 - Alarm Level Distribution 
Alarm Level # of Fires % of Fires 
1 9444 93.39% 
2 647 6.40% 
3 20 0.20% 
4 1 0.01% 
Severe Total 668 6.6% 
 
Fires that generated a response at a second alarm level or above comprised the worst 
6.6 per cent (668) of fires. 
 
3.2.6 Establishment of Relative Severity 
To compare the severity of various types of fires, the team established a value of 
relative severity. The team developed the following formulas to calculate relative 
severity. 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 =  # 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠   
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 =  # 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠  
 
The team then calculated the ratio between the severe percentages and the total 
percentages. The team called this ratio the relative severity. A relative severity of one 
indicated that the distribution of a specific type of fire, matches the distribution of all 
fires. This established a baseline of severity that the team then used to determine 
whether subsets of the data were more or less severe than average. A relative severity 
value above one indicated a type of fire where incidents are, on average, more severe. 
A relative severity value below one indicated a type of fire where incidents are, on 
average, less severe. 
 
The team used the relative severity measure to compare the following subsets of fires in 
the dataset: 
• Season 
• Area of Origin 
• Cause 
• Source of Energy 
• Appliance (or Object) 
• Time of Day 
• Presence of a Working Smoke Alarm 
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3.3 Comparing Data to the Home Fire Safety Campaigns  
The team made a comparison between AIRS data and MFB media releases and the 
2009-2013 Home Fire Safety Campaigns. The team completed two main goals in order 
to accomplish this task: a graphed timeline of different types of fires and their incident 
trends while the campaigns were running, and an analysis of MFB media releases. 
 
3.3.1 Creation of Timeline to Compare Messaging of HFSC 
The team created a series of timelines to display incident data with respect to the timing 
of the various campaigns. We then compared incident rates for 2009-13 to campaign 
messages to see if certain incidents were more or less common at specific times of the 
year. We graphed residential structure fires, unattended cooking fires, smoking in bed 
fires, and heater fires on a timeline from 2009 to 2013. We highlighted the number of 
incidents occurring during each of the campaigns in order to isolate any trends and 
discover if fire incidents decreased in the presence of the HFSC. 
 
3.3.2 Analysis of Media Release Messaging  
The team examined media releases generated by MFB during 2013. The goal of this 
analysis was to estimate the amount of media releases relating to residential structure 
fires that included one or more home fire safety messages. The team noted if releases 
in the sample period (2013) contained a prevention message, a preparedness 
message, or a smoke alarm message. The team defined a prevention message as a 
specific action that could be taken to prevent a fire. A preparedness message was one 
that specifically stated what someone could do to be prepared for a fire. A smoke alarm 
message was one that contained a statement about the need for a working smoke 
alarm, not just if a smoke alarm was present during a fire. 
 
The team did not analyse whether subsequent media coverage included home fire 
safety prevention or preparedness messaging. This is a potential area for future 
research.  
3.4 Examination of Other Safety Organisations 
In order to gain a better understanding of community resilience and risk communication 
strategies, the team examined the activities of other organisations with public safety 
initiatives. We conducted research into various campaigns and other activities to find 
out what had been successful for other organisations. Based on our literature review, 
which had provided us with several approaches to risk communication, we sought out 
specific activities and campaigns that had used these approaches effectively.   
3.5 Isolation of Potential Home Fire Safety Issues 
Using the evidence generated through analysis of the AIRS data, the team isolated 
three specific fire scenarios. The goal in isolating these scenarios was to find specific 
situations that the evidence suggested might be a useful area for MFB to focus on in the 
future. The team considered three criteria to select the fire scenarios: frequency, 
severity, and potential for targeting. 
 
First, the team isolated the types of fires that occurred most often AND were relatively 
severe (i.e. a relative severity above one). These results are presented in Chapter 4. 
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Next, the team considered the potential for the type of fire to be targeted by a 
community resilience activity. In this consideration, the team isolated scenarios that 
could be addressed in multiple ways, and not just through an advertising campaign akin 
to the HFSC.  
3.6 Limitations of this Study 
Some limitations exist with the findings of this study. Primarily, these limitations arise 
from the data. First, due to the scope of this project, the study only considered data from 
the Metropolitan District. No CFA fire data was analysed even though the HFSC is run 
in partnership with CFA. Additionally, no demographic information is available in AIRS, 
so no analysis of high-risk groups or emerging risks related to demographics are 
presented in this study. Finally, inconsistency and inaccuracy are present in AIRS. Data 
can be recorded incorrectly, or a more general field can be chosen when a more 
specific field is available. Because this study focused heavily on the qualitative data 
within the description field, the accuracy of the data is limited to the amount of detail 
provided.  
3.7 Conclusion 
In order to gain further knowledge about the Home Fire Safety Campaigns, the team 
analysed each of the campaigns from 2009-13. Then the team investigated all 
preventable residential structure fires in AIRS from 2008-13. We then mapped the fire 
incident data to common HFSC messaging. The team also analysed media releases 
from MFB to see if they could be further used to promote home fire safety. The group 
researched other public safety organisations to find commonalities between successful 
campaigns. Lastly, the team isolated potential home fire safety issues that MFB could 
focus future community resilience activities on. 
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4. Results and Analysis 
 
This section describes the six primary findings of this research project. 
• Finding 1: The 2009-2013 Home Fire Safety Campaigns targeted three primary 
home fire safety issues.  
• Finding 2: There is no evidence that the HFSC had an effect.  
• Finding 3: Residential structure fires originate from a variety of scenarios that 
vary broadly between frequency and severity. 
• Finding 4: The evidence suggests three types of fires that MFB could consider as 
future targets for home fires safety activities. 
• Finding 5: A holistic approach and partnerships were two common features of 
effective public safety activities. 
• Finding 6: Effective campaigns tailor messaging based on the desired outcome 
and intended audience. 
4.1 The 2009-2013 Home Fire Safety Campaigns 
Finding 1: The 2009-2013 Home Fire Safety Campaigns targeted three primary 
home fire safety issues.  
 
The team conducted an analysis of the five years of HFS campaigns to determine some 
basic characteristics of the campaigns. A summary of this analysis is located in 
Appendix J. 
 
All HFSCs ran during the winter months, with campaigns lasting 92 days on average. 
The campaigns’ start and end dates coincided with the beginning and end of winter 
respectively.   
 
Over the five-year period, the budget for each campaign averaged $221,636. The 
majority of every campaign’s budget (75 per cent on average) was spent on media buy 
through Master Agency Media Service (MAMS). The components of each year’s media 
buy included print media (newspaper and magazine), radio advertisements, outdoor 
advertisements, and digital media. As required by the Victorian Government, at least 10 
per cent of the budget (usually more) was spent on Culturally and Linguistically Diverse 
(CALD) advertising.  
 
Additionally, MFB spent about $10,000 per year on external evaluations, apart from 
2009 when no evaluation was completed. The evaluations attempted to provide MFB 
with information about the success of the campaigns in terms of reach and behaviour 
change. The evaluations of behaviour change will be discussed in Section 4.2. Table 7 
provides a summary of the evaluation of marketing reach for 2013. Each type of media 
reached approximately 50-60 per cent of their potential audience. Potential audience is 
the number of people each media type is theoretically capable of reaching. Print media 
offered the most cost effective option, reaching about 48 people per dollar spent.  
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Table 7 - Marketing Reach of 2013 HFSC 
Media Type 
# of People 
Reached (18+) 
% of Potential 
People Reached 
(18+) 
Amount of 
Money Spent 
People (18+) 
Reached per 
Dollar 
Print 2,041,000 61.8% $42,189 48 
Outdoor N/A 64.6% $36,540 N/A 
Radio 1,723,000 47.7% $66,668 25 
   
The HFSC targeted demographics that MFB considered vulnerable or at risk. The 
HFSCs from 2009-13 primarily targeted families and older people. Beginning in 2012, 
the campaigns also began focusing on those who cook, those aged 65 years or older, 
and males aged 18-34. 
 
Every HFSC is run in partnership with CFA. In 2009, 2010, and 2011, the campaign 
also partnered with Energy Safe Victoria (ESV). ESV is the safety regulator responsible 
for electrical and gas safety in Victoria.  ESV funded television advertisements to 
promote safe cooking practices and safe use of electric blankets. In 2010 and 2011, the 
HFSC partnered with Archicentre, the building advisory service for the Australian 
Institute of Architects (AIA). Archicentre works with the building industry and with 
community in building design, advice and home inspections including pre purchase 
residential inspections and as part of a Victorian State Government free home safety 
inspection service for older people and people with disability.  
 
The overall goal of the HFSC throughout the period from 2009-13 was to raise the 
Victorian community’s awareness of home fire safety issues during the winter months. 
The 2009-13 HFSCs all focused on the dangers of unattended cooking and heater 
fires. Figure 4 shows a 2010 campaign advertisement warning Victorians of the danger 
of unattended cooking. Additional campaign materials for all five years are located in 
Appendix K. 
 
Figure 4 - A 2010 HFSC Advertisement in the Herald Sun Newspaper 
Beginning in 2012, the HFSC shifted its theme to one of personal responsibility. The 
campaigns began targeting risky behaviour with call to action messages based around 
personal responsibility. One of the primary risky behaviours advertised was 
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smoking in bed. Figure 5 shows a 2013 campaign poster advertising the dangers of 
smoking in bed.  
 
 
Figure 5 - A 2013 HFSC Advertisement 
4.2 Effect of the 2009-2013 Home Fire Safety Campaigns 
Finding 2: There is no evidence that the HFSC had an effect.  
The team analysed campaign evaluations and AIRS data from 2009-13, attempted to 
determine if there were any trends in the AIRS data that could potentially show the 
impact of advertised HFSC messages such as unattended cooking, smoking in bed, 
and heater fires. 
 
4.2.1 Campaign Evaluations 
In 2010 and 2011, Enhance Research evaluated the HFSC. These evaluations show 
that a significant portion of survey respondents took actions to keep their home safe 
from fire. For example, about half of respondents tested their smoke alarms and took 
extra care to minimise distractions. However, these evaluations did not attempt to 
isolate whether respondents took these actions specifically because of the campaign.  
 
In 2012 and 2013, another media company, Wallis, attempted to measure behaviour 
change resulting from the campaign. These evaluations showed that very few survey 
respondents had taken any action to increase their home fire safety after seeing a 
HFSC advertisement. Only about four per cent of survey respondents (n=508) 
undertook a home fire safety activity because they saw a HFSC advertisement. 
Appendix J contains a summary of the results from the four years of evaluation. 
 
4.2.2 Winter as a Campaign Time Period 
On average the winter months of June, July, and August accounted for 26 per cent 
(2667) of all fires for the years of 2008 to 2013. The even distribution of fires by month 
and season is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 - Percentage of Residential Structure Fires by Season 2008-2013 
 
 
Figure 7 - Percentage of Residential Structure Fires by Season 2001-2007 
 
To attempt to determine if this distribution was due to the impact of the HFSCs, the 
team obtained additional AIRS data for residential structure fires from 2001-2007. The 
even distribution of these years is in Figure 8 shows that the number of winter fires did 
not decline in the past thirteen years. From this data, it is not possible to state that 
the HFSCs from 2009 to 2013 had an impact on residential fires during winter. 
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However, although the overall number of fires has trended slightly upwards, this has 
occurred in the context of a rapidly rising population.  
 
 
Figure 8 - Residential Structure Fires of Winter 2001-2013 
The team calculated the statistical significance of the difference in the number of fires 
from season to season and found that the difference between seasons was statistically 
insignificant. The probability of the variation being statistically insignificant was greater 
than 99 per cent. This calculation is in Appendix L. 
 
The team also examined the severity of winter fires and found that on average, winter 
accounted for 24.7 per cent of severe fires across the three indicators of severity. 
Additionally, when analysed with regards to relative severity, each season has a value 
at or near one. This indicates that the distribution of severe fires is not dependent 
upon the season.  
 
Between 2008 and 2013, residential structure fires caused an estimated $164,981,374 
in damage with an average dollar loss per incident of $16,315. Fires occurring in the 
winter months accounted for 24 per cent of total dollar loss figures, with an 
average dollar loss per incident of $14,516. The lower average dollar loss per incident 
of winter is shown in Figure 9. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Fi
re
s 
Pe
r M
ill
io
n 
Pe
op
le
 
Residential Structure Fires of Melbourne 
Victoria 
Total
Winter
28 
 
 
Figure 9 - Average Dollar Loss per Incident by Month from 2008-2013 
In total, winter had the highest percentage of fires confined to their room of origin 
(92.7 per cent), as well as the fewest fires extending beyond their structure of 
origin (12). Fires occurring in the winter comprised 26 per cent (2499) of all first 
alarm fires. In terms of casualties, winter comprised 27 per cent (94) of injuries and 24 
per cent (8) of fatalities. 
 
4.2.3 Kitchen and Unattended Cooking Fires 
A primary focus of all the HFSCs since 2009 has been unattended cooking fires. As 
such, the team graphed unattended cooking fires on a timeline along with all residential 
structure fires from 2009 to 2013. Figure 10 shows that variations exist in both 
unattended cooking fires and all residential structure fires for the five-year period. 
     
 
Figure 10 - Unattended Cooking vs. All Residential Structure Fires 2009-2013 
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In Figure 10, the red portions of the lines represent the HFSC periods while the grey 
portions represent the time when the campaign was not running. The lower line 
represents all of the unattended cooking fires with respect to each month from 2009-
2013. Unattended cooking fires included those caused by people who left the kitchen for 
just a minute, people who became distracted, and even people who left the house. 
 
Throughout all months, including the months of the campaigns, there is no clear trend. 
The two black lines are trend lines of their respective line graphs, each with very small 
slopes indicating little to no trend. This figure illustrates that the team found no 
evidence that the campaigns had an impact on unattended cooking fires. 
  
4.2.4 Heater Fires 
Figure 11 shows that heater fires exhibited an obvious trend in relation to month of 
occurrence. Similar to Figure 10, the red portions of the line indicate the times when the 
HFSC was running. The team also investigated heater fires to determine if any 
particular cause occurred more often during any specific month(s). The team 
hypothesised that fires resulting from mechanical failure of heaters would occur more 
frequently in the months before winter as heaters are beginning to be used for the first 
time in months. The team found that the only two causes that exhibited any trend, not 
paying attention and improper use of heaters, followed the same trend as heater fires 
overall. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Heater Fires 2009-2013 
Overall, the trends evident in Figure 11 suggest that the HFSCs have focused on 
heater fires when they are already occurring, rather than advertising earlier when 
heater fires are beginning to increase in frequency.  
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4.2.5 Smoking in Bed 
One of the main messages of the 2012 and 2013 HFSCs was the danger of smoking in 
bed. The team produced a timeline of all residential structure fires caused by smoking in 
the bedroom (as a proxy for smoking in bed) from 2008-13. The team found no trend in 
smoking in bed in terms of time of the year. This is likely to be due to the small sample 
size of smoking in bed incidents. The team was aware that smoking in bed was likely to 
be a focus of the HFSCs due to the relatively high incidents of fatalities from smoking 
(about 40 per cent of all deaths). We were unable to find any evidence in the AIRS 
data to determine if the campaign had an impact on the number of fires resulting 
from smoking in bed. 
4.3 Definition of the Home Fire Safety Problem  
Finding 3: Residential structure fires originate from a variety of scenarios that 
vary broadly between frequency and severity. 
 
The team analysed the frequency and severity of fires in terms of area of origin, cause, 
source of energy, appliance, time of day, and presence of a working smoke alarm. A full 
list of these results is in Appendix H. We found that there are a multitude of ways a fire 
can start in the home. There are very few types of fires that are both frequent and 
severe, and therefore these would provide an obvious target for interventions to 
improve safety outcomes. 
    
4.3.1 Area of Origin 
Fires are common in the kitchen, structural areas, living areas and the bedroom. 
Kitchen fires accounted for 50 per cent (5026) of fires, structural areas accounted for 11 
per cent (1151), and living areas and bedrooms both accounted for eight per cent (820 
and 846 respectively). The other eight areas accounted for the remaining 23 per cent 
(2269) of fires.  
 
Although kitchen fires were the most common, they were also the second least 
severe area of origin (the least severe was utility areas). Of the top five most common 
fires, those in the structural areas, living areas, and bedrooms all had relative severities 
above one, indicating a severity above average. Garage fires were found to be the 
most severe fires, however they were one of the least common. Fires in the other 
and unknown categories were among the highest in terms of relative severity, however 
neither is suitable as a potential target for intervention due to the varied or unknown 
nature of these incidents. Refer to Figure 12 for information on the relative severity and 
occurrence of all ten areas of origin. 
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Figure 12 - Severity of Residential Structure Fires by Area of Origin 
4.3.2 Cause 
Cooking related fires, regardless of the action that caused them, accounted for 36 per 
cent (3654) of fires. However, cooking related fires also had the lowest relative 
severity of any cause, and comprised twelve per cent (4) of deaths. In the kitchen, 
unattended cooking fires, those which could be (and have been) advertised and easily 
prevented accounted for 23 per cent (2267) of fires. Fires caused by a person not 
paying attention (excluding cooking) were the most severe fires, but comprised 
only 4.2 per cent (423) of all fires. Mechanical failure fires comprised 36 per cent 
(3654) of fires and we found them to be average in severity. Improper use fires 
accounted for 12 per cent (1232) of fires and were more severe than mechanical failure 
fires. Fires in the other and unknown cause groupings were again among the most 
severe but are not a suitable target for potential intervention. 
 
4.3.3 Source of Energy 
The most common source of energy associated with fires was electricity, comprising 
52.2 per cent (5282) of fires in the dataset, followed by gas accounting for 23.9 per cent 
(2413) of fires. Both of these sources of energy produced fires with a relative severity of 
less than one, indicating that on average these fires were less severe. However, electric 
appliances caused at least nine deaths (27 per cent). Fires caused by an open flame 
produced the highest relative severity, but only accounted for 5.6 per cent (563) of fires. 
Figure 13 shows that the fires that are more severe, also happen to be the fires that 
are less common. Fires in the other and unknown category were among the most 
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severe, but again are not a suitable intervention target due to the lack of information 
about these types of fire.  
 
 
Figure 13 - Severity of Residential Structure Fires by Source of Energy 
4.3.4 Appliances 
The team’s data analysis found there were a large number of appliances that started or 
were involved in fires. However, out of 41 different appliances categorised, there 
were five that were individually responsible for more than five per cent of fires, 
with stove being the largest.  
 
Figure 14 shows the top ten appliances that caused or were involved in a fire. Only 
three appliances in the top ten have a relative severity above one, indicating a 
type of fire that is more likely to be severe. Stoves were the most common appliance 
comprising 27 per cent (2769) of all fires. Of the top ten, the four appliances typically 
found exclusively in the kitchen (stove, oven, toaster, microwave) have the lowest 
relative severity figures. We found that cigarettes were relatively severe and accounted 
for 7 per cent (714) of fires. Smoking was also the cause of 39 per cent (14) of fires 
resulting in fatalities. Candle fires were high in severity, but accounted for only two per 
cent (224) of fires. Electrical infrastructure fires accounted for 8.9 per cent (897) of fires 
and were relatively severe. Heaters comprised 6.8 per cent (687) of fires and had a 
relative severity below one. However, heater fires did account for five deaths (15 per 
cent). Fires in the unknown category were the most severe, while fires in the “other” 
category were more severe than all but cigarette, candle, and unknown fires. 
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Figure 14 - Residential Structure Fires by Appliance 
4.3.5 Time of Day 
The distribution of fires, both in terms of frequency and severity, is not uniform across all 
twenty-four hours of the day. Of the three periods that the team split the 24 hours of a 
day into, night-time was the only period which had a relative severity above one, 
indicating that fires are more severe when they occur between the hours of 23:00 
and 7:00 and comprised 42 per cent (14) of all deaths. However, fires at night also 
encompassed only 16.1 per cent (1630) of fires. Fires during the evening (15:00-23:00) 
encompassed 50.4 per cent (5100) of all fires but were found to have the lowest relative 
severity. 
 
4.3.6 Presence of a Working Smoke Alarm 
When the presence of a working smoke alarm is considered, fires where a smoke alarm 
was not present or failed to operate had the highest relative severity, indicating that 
fires tend to be the most severe when smoke alarms fail or are not present. 
Additionally, the injury rate (injuries per 100 fires) increased by nearly 66 per cent (4.9 
vs. 3) when a smoke alarm was not present or failed to operate. The fatality rate 
(fatalities per 1000 fires) also increased by nearly five times when a smoke alarm was 
not present or failed to operate (7.3 vs. 1.5). 
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4.4 Three Prominent Home Fire Safety Issues 
Finding 4: The evidence suggests three types of fires that MFB could consider as 
future targets for home fires safety activities. 
 
Using the criteria from Section 3.6, the team identified three HFS issues that had a 
balance between severity and frequency.  
 
4.4.1 Smoking Related Fires 
Fires caused by a cigarette comprised seven per cent (714) of all fires. Cigarette fires 
also had a high relative severity, indicating a severity well above average. In addition, 
fires involving cigarettes were the most common cause of fatalities, accounting for 13 
deaths (39 per cent). Smoking also features prominently in a variety of areas of origin. 
Cigarette fires comprised ten per cent (77) of living area and 18 per cent (135) of 
bedroom fires. Cigarettes pose a high threat due to their capability to bring a source of 
heat in contact with a variety of flammable materials. Additionally, reckless disposal of 
cigarettes can often cause ignition. An example of this happened in 2012 when a 
discarded cigarette caused the ignition of tan bark, which quickly spread to the structure 
of a house. The fire resulted in approximately $110,000 of damage, spread throughout 
the structure of origin and required a second alarm response from MFB. 
 
4.4.2 Electrical Fires 
As a source of energy, electricity featured in 52 per cent (5,282) of all fires. Because of 
the vast array of appliances that are powered by electricity in the home, the team looked 
closely at fires involving the electrical infrastructure in the home. Fires originating from 
electric infrastructure accounted for nine per cent (897) of fires, while also having a 
moderately high relative severity. Fires originating in electrical infrastructure are typically 
hidden and therefore are more likely to be severe because the fire can spread 
unnoticed for an extended amount of time. An example of this occurred in 2011, when 
an electrical fault in the roof space of a home cause a fire, which quickly began to 
spread. By the time the fire was under control it had caused an estimated $280,000 in 
damage, spread throughout the entire roof space, and required a second alarm 
response from MFB. 
 
4.4.3 Working Smoke Alarms 
The presence of a working smoke alarm reduces the risks associated with residential 
structure fires. Fires where a smoke alarm either failed to operate or was not present 
had a relative severity well above one, while fires in which a smoke alarm was present 
had a relative severity well below one. The injury rate increases by 66 per cent when a 
smoke alarm was not present or failed to operate. Additionally, smoke alarms were not 
present in 42 per cent (14) of fatalities. Smoke alarms are integral to home fire safety in 
their ability to alert an occupant to the presence of a fire. Residents are highly 
vulnerable to a fire when sleeping when there is no functional smoke alarm. This is 
supported by our finding that fires occurring between the hours of 23:00 and 7:00 had 
the highest relative severity in terms of time of day. An example of this type of incident 
occurred in 2008, when just before 1AM a fire started in the bedroom of an unregistered 
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boarding house with no smoke alarms. Three people were able to evacuate in time but 
three people lost their lives in the fire. 
4.5 A Holistic Approach to Public Safety Concerns 
Finding 5: A holistic approach and partnerships were two common features of 
effective public safety activities. 
 
A holistic approach to a public safety issue, as discussed in Section 2.5.2, is one that 
addresses an identified problem on multiple fronts. This can include raising awareness 
in the community, but also taking actions to improve the physical and social 
environment. The team found that partnerships are a useful tool because they allow for 
the multiplication of resources as well as the opportunity to leverage various skillsets 
that can contribute in different ways to addressing the problem.  
 
The team also found that using data and statistics to their full advantage could 
contribute to a better understanding of which issues to target. This can better 
inform decisions an organisation makes regarding its strategy to address a particular 
safety concern. The following case study provides an example that the team found of a 
successful holistic approach to the road safety problem in Victoria, Australia.  
 
4.5.1 Case Study: Transport Accident Commission’s Holistic Approach to Road 
Safety 
The Transport Accident Commission of Victoria (TAC) is a State Government 
organisation dedicated to improving road safety. TAC focuses all its actions towards 
an aspirational goal of no deaths and injuries on the road. They take a holistic 
approach to reducing the number and severity of road accidents by approaching the 
problem of road safety in more than one way by targeting “safer roads, safer 
vehicles, safer speeds, safer people”. 75 
 
A large part of this strategy is the partnerships that TAC has with VicRoads, Victoria 
Police, and the Department of Justice to implement the Victorian Government’s road 
safety strategy. The road safety strategy is a multifaceted approach to road safety 
that combines, “targeting high risk behaviour, road-safety law enforcement, 
education and public awareness initiatives, research and development, and 
improvements to Victoria's road network.” 76 
 
TAC uses crash statistics as well as injury and fatality data to analyse causation. 
They use data to concentrate their efforts on trends where they believe they can 
make the biggest impact. They also conduct research to gain a better understanding 
of high-risk groups, emerging issues of concern, peoples’ views of road safety, and 
the success of their programs, among others.77 
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TAC runs education and road safety campaigns that target a range of driving 
behaviours and a range of ages to encourage safer people. The major objectives 
underpinning TAC’s public education campaigns are: 
• To place road safety on the public agenda and create an environment where 
behaviour change can be fostered 
• To deter drivers from unsafe behaviour by increasing their perceived risk of 
being involved in a crash, and their perceived risk of being caught by police 
• To provide a supporting rationale for police to conduct enforcement activities 
• To provide information that supports drivers to adopt safer behaviours 
TAC’s road safety campaigns commonly have the following features: 
• Integration with other initiatives such as enforcement and regulation 
• Guidance from market researchers to ensure effective communication of key 
messages to target audiences 
• An emotive style of advertising designed to be attention grabbing 
• Complementary advertising to highlight police enforcement capabilities 
• Television as the prime medium supported by radio, press, outdoor and direct 
contact approaches that either reinforce or complement the main messages. 
• Strong public relations activity designed to enhance newsworthiness and 
sensitise the public to the campaign 
• Evaluation to assess impact of the campaign and to guide future 
approaches78  
TAC also partners with a local soccer team and the cricket league in Australia to help 
promote the safer speeds message to sports fans.79  
To contribute to its safer vehicles initiative, TAC conducts vehicle safety research 
and testing. They also run the Safer Road Infrastructure Program (SRIP) spending 
$100 million per year on road safety measures aimed at the most prevalent causes 
of accidents.80 TAC and its partners have been very successful in decreasing the 
road injuries and the road toll. Victoria’s road toll has decreased by about 700 deaths 
a year since the 1970s, and the injuries have decreased almost 50 per cent since 
1987. In 2013, the road toll was a record low.  
 
4.5.2 Media Releases 
The team identified that MFB media releases about residential fire incidents are a 
potential area where a more holistic approach to home fire safety could be adopted. The 
team found that most MFB media releases about residential structure fire incidents 
did not include a preventative message, and none included a preparedness 
message. 
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In 2013, MFB produced 62 media releases related to residential structure fire incidents. 
Of these media releases, none mentioned a preparedness message. 22.6 per cent 
mentioned a smoke alarm message, and 6.5 per cent mentioned a prevention message. 
While the cause of some of these fires was likely to be unknown at the time the media 
release was produced, only 40 per cent of preventable fires mentioned a home fire 
safety prevention measure. Figure 15 is an example of a media release: 
 
The house fire in Sandringham was believed to have started by a heater with 
clothes being dried next to it. 
 
The working smoke alarms alerted the occupant to the fire and she safely 
escaped with minor burns to the hands and arms and slight smoke inhalation. 
The female occupant was then transported by Ambulance to hospital for 
further observation. 
 
The fire was contained to a small section of the lounge room on the ground 
floor and brought under control in approximately 5 minutes. 
 
Approximately 11 firefighters attended. 
Figure 15 - Sample MFB Web Media Release 
MFB produced this media release during the period of the 2013 HFSC. The fire was 
preventable and the cause was known at the time of the media release. There is no 
prevention or preparedness message in the release. The release does mention a 
smoke alarm, but the importance of having a working smoke alarm is not emphasised. 
This example illustrates that there are opportunities for MFB to used existing (and 
cost-free) communication channels to convey home fire safety messages that 
support the messaging of the HFSC.  
4.6 Methods to Establish an Effective Campaign 
Finding 6: Effective campaigns tailor messaging based on the desired outcome 
and intended audience. 
 
The team found that effective campaigns tailor public safety messages to a specific 
outcome and audience. We found that to do this, an organisation must perform 
research and proactively analyse data. Data and statistics contribute to a better 
understanding of common or sometimes emerging risks that exist. It can also help an 
organisation better understand its target audience. The team found specific examples of 
successful public safety campaigns, which tailored their messaging based on their 
desired outcome and intended audience. 
 
4.6.1 Case Study: Advertising a Simple Message with the Fire Department of 
Austin, Texas 
The team’s research of the literature (Section 2.5.4) suggested that a campaign can be 
effective when it focuses on a simple action. The following case study illustrates a 
campaign that effectively focused on simple action. 
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The Austin Fire Department in Austin, Texas, USA runs a campaign called ‘Put a 
Finger On It’ promoting fire safety. It uses a simple actionable message to 
encourage people to test their smoke alarms.   
 
A series of fatal house fires in early 2002 set the year on course to be one of the 
deadliest years for house fires in Austin’s history. A fire fatality task force was 
established to try to determine a pattern of the deaths. They found that the only 
common characteristic of the fatal fires was that each of the fires occurred in a house 
that had a smoke alarm that was not operational. Austin had previously run public 
education campaigns about the importance of having a smoke alarm in homes. This 
message had been effective, but the spate of fatalities highlighted the need for a new 
message to be tailored to the emerging risk of non-operational smoke alarms. 
 
The city created a slogan and message that would inspire people to test their smoke 
alarm. From research, the task force knew that most homes had smoke alarms and 
a majority of people knew that the way to test them was to put a finger on the button. 
To that purpose, the character Freddy Finger was created with the slogan “Put a 
Finger On It” as seen in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16 - Put a Finger On It Logo81 
The campaign was unveiled in front of the media and residents of the city. The next 
day there was a fire fatality from a young woman that had been smoking in bed and 
fell asleep. There was a non-operating smoking alarm outside her bedroom. The fire 
department used the media attention drawn by this fatality to jumpstart the launch of 
the campaign. The campaign resulted in an improved safety outcome for the Austin 
community with zero fire fatalities for the two years following the campaign. 
 
‘Put a Finger On It’ was a popular and effective campaign because it was simple and 
focused on a concrete action. The campaign did not seek to change habits and 
ingrained behaviour patterns, but instead to reduce injuries and fatalities by 
improving the environment that people lived in. The campaign also took advantage 
of the media attention from fires to spread lifesaving messages. 82 
 
                                            
81 Fire Prevention Campaigns (2013) 
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4.6.2 Addressing an Emerging Risk with New Zealand Fire Service’s Don’t Drink 
and Fry Campaign 
As the research (Section 2.5.7) suggests, a campaign can be effective when an 
emerging risk is targeted. The following case study illustrates a campaign that 
effectively targeted an emerging risk. 
 
The New Zealand Fire Service (NZFS) has demonstrated the ability to successfully 
reduce an emerging risk with their Don’t Drink and Fry campaign. 
 
Through an analysis of fire data, NZFS found that 50 per cent of all fatal residential 
structure fires involved alcohol, and that these fatalities were often due to intoxicated 
people coming home from the pub and falling asleep while cooking. Armed with this 
information, NZFS launched the ‘Don’t Drink and Fry’ campaign. They tailored the 
campaign to intoxicated people to encourage them to get take away food rather than 
going home to cook while drunk.83 
 
The primary outlet for the campaign was television, although posters, billboards, and 
even pizza boxes were also used. An example of one of the campaign posters is 
shown in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17 - Don't Drink and Fry Poster 
There were four different television commercials that featured various intoxicated 
people being interviewed on the street about the dangers of drunk cooking, advising 
that getting take away is the safe thing to do. NZFS also partnered with Hell Pizza 
which agreed to put the don’t drink and fry message on over a million pizza boxes as 
well as 100,000 scratch tickets. The campaign targeted the younger population, 
                                            
83 Fahy, Ben (2011) 
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using humour as a marketing tool. This was accomplished through the actual 
advertisements, which used amusing interviews with members of the public, as well 
as a spin-off of the popular “don’t drink and drive” slogan. The campaign appeared to 
be effective with a decrease of almost 40 per cent in unattended cooking fires in 
2009 to 2010.84 
 
4.6.3 Advertising without Advertising with Melbourne Metro’s Dumb Ways to Die 
Research (Section 2.5.5) shows that advertising in such a way that does not appear 
to be advertising is an effective way to advocate public safety messages. The 
following case study illustrates an example of a campaign created with this intent. 
 
In 2012, Metro Trains of Melbourne, Victoria created its campaign called ‘Dumb 
Ways to Die’. Data suggested that there were several preventable accidents on the 
train system so the intention of this campaign was to advocate safe behaviour 
around trains. Campaign messages were conveyed through newspapers, radio, 
outdoor advertising, YouTube, and via a smartphone application. John Mescall, the 
creator of the campaign said, “The aim of this campaign is to engage an audience 
that really doesn't want to hear any kind of safety message…”85 Mescall said that he 
understood that people, especially young people, do not like being told what to do, 
and “what's really interesting about this work is it never tells you not to do it…”86 The 
campaign was tailored to this type of audience and was created to be an ad that did 
not look like an ad, entertainment rather than advertising, because “no one shares 
advertising”.87 The campaign video featured cartoon creatures dying in various 
‘dumb’, yet amusing, ways. A catchy song narrating various deaths in a cheerful 
manner accompanied the video. They took a serious safety message and used dark 
humour in a joyful way to engage the intended audience. Figure 18 is an example 
poster from the campaign. 
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85 Campaign Brief (2014) 
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Figure 18 - Dumb Ways to Die Poster 
Within 24 hours, the song had made the top ten list on iTunes, and within 48 hours, 
the video had received 2.7 million views on YouTube.88 An article published by The 
Age newspaper two weeks after the release of the video estimated that it had 
generated more than 700 mentions in the press.89 The campaign subsequently won 
multiple awards for various features such as animation, branded content, and 
music.90 According to Mescall, “ultimately the success of the campaign was getting 
young people talking – and evidently even singing – about rail safety.”91 
 
A viral video and a number of awards were not the only success that the campaign 
achieved. There was a decrease from 13.29 near misses per million kilometres of 
track from November 2011 to January 2012 to 9.17 near misses for the same period 
one year later.92 The year 2013 then saw a drop in fatalities (excluding suspected 
suicides) from ten in 2012 to five in 2013. There was also a drop in serious injuries 
from 41 in 2012 to 26 in 2013.93 
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5. Conclusions and Discussion 
 
The Home Fire Safety Campaigns from 2009-13 focused primarily on three key 
messages: unattended cooking, heater fires, and smoking in bed. The team found no 
evidence that the campaign was effective at changing peoples’ behaviour. An 
evaluation survey found that only four per cent of respondents said they changed their 
behaviour as a result of the campaign. Neither was there evidence that the campaign 
was effective at reducing the frequency of fires, as incidents related to the campaign 
messages did not decrease during the study period. Because there was no evidence 
for the campaign making a difference, MFB should reconsider how to approach 
home fire safety engagement with the public in the future. MFB’s current approach 
to home fire safety includes a variety of activities that could be considered part of a 
holistic approach. However, this approach could be expanded to include more proactive 
data collection and analysis, partnerships, media relations, a focus on desired 
outcomes, and the use multiple communication channels.  
 
Proactive data collection and analysis would allow MFB to do five things: identify target 
issues, identify the target audience, create relevant messages, measure each 
intervention’s success, and determine future courses of action. Using this data will 
enable MFB to make evidence-based policy decisions. Proactive data analysis would  
enable MFB to identify risks, emerging and pre-existing. By identifying target issues, 
MFB could effectively tailor its messaging to target audiences to achieve the greatest 
efficacy. MFB could determine how effective its activities are by taking steps to ensure 
that success can be measured, such as pre- and post- intervention surveys, and 
effective evaluations. Once the impact of the activity is measured, a future course of 
action can be determined. Through continuous re-evaluation, MFB can make its 
activities more effective and reallocate the resources of activities that are not being 
successful.  
 
Previous HFSCs addressed cooking fires because they are the most frequent fires. The 
relative severity measure developed in this study found that kitchen fires were on 
average not severe fires. Most fires in the kitchen started from cooking left unattended. 
Previous Home Fire Safety Campaigns have targeted unattended cooking fires, but 
there is no evidence that these campaigns have been effective. The team’s research 
identified three issues that could be future targets for MFB: smoking related fires, 
electrical fires and working smoke alarms.  
Smoking related fires are a significant source of severe fires and fire fatalities, and are a 
potential target for future community resilience activities. While smoking inside is 
targetable, it is a difficult behaviour to change because it mandates that a person break 
a long held habit. VicHealth is a Victorian organisation dedicated to “promoting good 
health and preventing chronic disease.”94 One of VicHealth’s main priorities is to reduce 
the number of people that smoke.95 VicHealth already partners with other organisations, 
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such as Quit Victoria, an organisation that supports people who are trying to quit 
smoking, and is receptive to new partners. 96 To reduce smoking related fire fatalities 
and injuries, MFB could partner with VicHealth or other similar organisations to warn 
smokers of the danger of smoking inside and in bed.  
The team’s data analysis found that a significant number of severe fires are caused by 
electrical malfunction. Over half of fires involved electricity, and many fires started from 
electrical infrastructure, lights, and fans that malfunctioned. Fires starting within 
electrical infrastructure tend to be more severe than the average fire as they can burn in 
hard to detect places and spread quickly through the entire house. Electrical 
infrastructure fires are not a direct result of the day-to-day behaviour of the occupants of 
the house. While occupants can ensure that they are using appliances safely and are 
not overloading power boards or power points, these make up only a small portion of 
fires related to electrical infrastructure. The main problem is the complexity and difficulty 
of properly inspecting electrical infrastructure.   
 
Energy Safe Victoria (ESV) is “the independent technical regulator responsible for 
electricity, gas and pipeline safety in Victoria” 97 and offers an Electrical Home Safety 
Inspection which “is an inspection on the condition of an existing domestic electrical 
installation, to identify any electrical safety concerns or deficiencies”98. MFB could 
consider subsidising Electrical Home Safety Inspections. ESV has partnered with MFB 
in the past and renewing the partnership could benefit both organisations. In 2010, ESV 
produced television commercials that promoted the safe use of cooking appliances such 
as barbeques. These television commercials, which ran during the 2010 HFSC were 
funded by ESV and featured MFB firefighters. Evaluations of the HFSC in this period 
indicate that these commercials were more effective than radio or print advertising.   
 
The most severe fires occurred in homes without working smoke alarms. Since a 
significant number of severe fires occur at night, working smoke alarms are the most 
effective way to alert sleeping residents to the danger of these fires. The data revealed 
that homes without working smoke alarms had an injury rate much higher than that of 
homes with working smoke alarms. In addition, fires with the highest relative severity 
occurred when smoke alarms either were not present or did not operate. Working 
smoke alarms are already an issue targeted in the “Change Your Clock, Change Your 
Smoke Alarm Battery” campaign. However, the team’s data analysis found that this is 
an important issue and warrants further consideration by MFB.   
 
The team’s analysis of media releases found that they rarely included fire safety 
messages. Including these messages could give them more exposure in the media. The 
team did not conduct an analysis of the extent that actual media coverage of house fires 
includes prevention and preparedness messages. This could be a worthwhile area for 
future study.  Austin, Texas successfully used media attention to promote the Freddy 
Finger Campaign in 2002. They used the media attention following a fire fatality to 
                                            
96 VicHealth (2014) 
97 Energy Safe Victoria (2014) 
98 Energy Safe Victoria (2014) 
44 
 
emphasise the importance of working smoke alarms. Kevin Baum, who was involved in 
the creation of the campaign, writes, “firefighters must highlight tragedy in order to 
communicate important safety information to their citizens”99. 
 
Behaviour change and risk awareness is a complicated field of psychology and many 
models have been developed in an attempt to explain peoples’ actions and motivations 
with the goal of influencing their behaviour.100 Research outlined in Section 2.5.2 shows 
that it is more difficult to change ingrained habits than it is to have someone perform a 
simple action. MFB should consider some of these different models in the creation of 
future campaigns, activities, messages, and materials. 
 
MFB could refine the relative severity measure developed in this study. Relative severity 
was a measure we created to find the most severe fires, and it could be used more 
broadly to help determine major problem areas and make policy decisions. Taking into 
account severity provides MFB with another tool to analyse data in order to target 
messages. 
 
The AIRS data that the team analysed had several notable limitations.  Some of the 
data from AIRS was inaccurate when compared to what was written in the description 
field, which is a problem when attempting to determine emerging trends within the data. 
Finally, AIRS does not contain demographic information, making it impossible to track 
trends across the population. These limitations in AIRS may impact MFB’s ability to 
identify emerging risks. MFB should work to ensure the accuracy, reliability, and 
usefulness of the data input into AIRS.   
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Appendix A: Residences of Victoria and the Regulations 
Protecting them from Fire 
 
Victorians live in a wide variety of homes. Housing situations can be broken down into 
two main categories, private housing and social housing. Social housing encompasses 
both public housing and community housing. The Department of Human Services 
(DHS) in Victoria provides public housing for Victorians that need housing support. Not-
for-profit housing agencies and DHS manage community housing in partnership. The 
gradual rise of private housing in Victoria is shown in Figure 19.  
Figure 19 - Victorian Housing: Public vs. Private101 
 
The types of residential structures that are predominant in Victoria are detached 
houses, semi-detached houses, terrace houses, flats, and apartment buildings. 
Detached houses are free standing houses while both semi-detached houses and 
terrace houses are attached to others. A semi-detached house is attached to another 
house on only one side. Terrace houses are often arranged in rows, which is why they 
are also known as row houses, and are attached to other houses on more than one 
side. Flats are apartments that are usually single level and are located in buildings no 
more than two or three stories, whereas apartments are usually located in high rise 
buildings. Examples of semi-detached houses, terrace houses and flats are shown in 
Figure 20. 
                                            
101 ABS,4102.0 Australian Social Trends, 2012 
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Figure 20 - Semi-detached and Row Houses 
The Building Code of Australia (BCA) regulates all residential construction in Australia. 
Additionally social housing is regulated by the Department of Human Services Fire Risk 
Management Guidelines (FRMG). The FRMG refer to the BCA while also requiring 
additional restrictions. Smoke alarms are required in any residence as per the BCA102. 
Within Victoria, the BCA requires an automatic sprinkler system in any residential care 
building, shared accommodation building, and multiple dwelling buildings higher than 25 
meters.103 Additionally, the FRMG requires an automatic sprinkler system in any 
medium or high rise structure to be used in social housing104 and any community based 
home.105 
 
 
  
                                            
102 Building Code of Australia, Volumes I & II, 2013 
103 Building Code of Australia, Victoria Appendix, 2013 
104 DHS, Fire Risk Management for Multi-storey Residential Buildings, 2013, Page 9 
105 DHS, Fire Risk Management for Community-based houses, 2013, Page 9 
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Appendix B: Residential Structure Fires with a Focus on the 
US 
 
This appendix describes common residential structure fires. Hazards, common causes, 
specific risk scenarios, severity of house fires, prevention techniques, and typical fire 
department operations will be presented. The hazards that fires pose to the human 
body will be discussed to illustrate the potential for injury and death incurred by fire. 
Common causes are shown in order to demonstrate how easily fires can be started in 
the home. Elevated risk scenarios will be presented to provide a scope to the potential 
threat of residential structure fires to both the general public as well as specific 
demographics. Additionally a description of the severity of different residential structure 
fire scenarios will be presented in an attempt to better characterize fires ranging from 
minor to extreme. A look at how different agencies, organizations, companies, and fire 
departments around the world attempt to prevent residential structure fires will also be 
provided. Finally, this section will explore the actions taken in response to a fire incident, 
focusing primarily on fire department operations on scene. 
Hazard to Human Life 
The hazards related to residential structure fires have the potential to severely harm a 
human being. These hazards will be characterized as potential sources of harm that 
result from a fire scenario. Three main hazards of residential structure fires are structure 
damage, release of combustion products, and heat release.   
Structural damage can be widespread in scenarios where the fire spreads beyond its 
object of origin.  The worst case scenario of structural damage is the failure of the 
structure.  This can lead to occupants being trapped or killed by the collapsing debris 
(Cote, 2008). 
 
Occupants of residential structures are also highly susceptible to the products released 
by the materials that are burning.  Combustion products which are detrimental to human 
health and safety can be classified into three main groups: asphyxiants, 
sensory/respiratory irritants, and supertoxicants (Cote, 2008). These various products 
endanger humans by causing a loss of consciousness, interfering with egress attempts, 
and resulting in other harmful biological reactions to the combustion product. 
People who are exposed to fire are also in danger of injury or death due to the heat 
released by materials during their combustion. The heat produced in a fire is capable of 
severely harming humans in three main ways: burns to the skin, hyperthermia, and 
respiratory tract burns (Cote, 2008).  
Causes of Residential Structure Fires  
Residential structure fires can originate from a variety of different sources.  Some of the 
more common residential structure fires result from: cooking, heating, electrical 
malfunctions, careless behaviour, and open flames.  According to the U.S Fire 
Administration, from 2009-2011, “Cooking was the leading cause and accounted for 46 
per cent of all residential fires” (USFA, May 2013). The other causes of residential 
structure fires can be seen in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21 - Causes of US Residential Structure Fires 2009-2011 (USFA, May 2013) 
With regards to the specific fires that did not remain contained within their compartment 
of origin, the U.S Fire Administration reports that structural materials are most often the 
object ignited (34 per cent) to cause the nonconfined fire.  Additional objects of origin for 
nonconfined fires can be seen in Figure 22.   
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Figure 22 - Item First Ignited in Nonconfined US Residential Structure Fires 2009-2011 (USFA, May 2013) 
Elevated Risk Scenarios 
Certain demographics have been shown to be more vulnerable to both injury and fatality 
due to fire. The most vulnerable demographic is those aged 65 or older.  People 65 or 
older were shown to be 2.4 times more likely to perish in a fire within their homes than 
the general population of the US was in the time between 2007 and 2011.  In addition, 
people in the slightly younger demographic of 50-64 years of age were 1.4 times more 
likely to die in a fire than the general population (Ahrens, 2013).   
  
Factors other than age can also contribute to an increased vulnerability to the hazards 
of residential structure fires.  Time of year, time of day, and occupant location are 
important factors in residential structure fire scenarios.  According to the NFPA in 2007-
2011 (Ahrens, 2013): 
• 29% of home structure fires occurred in the winter months. 
• 37% of home structure fire deaths occurred in the winter months.   
• 20% of residential structure fires occurred between 11:00PM and 7:00AM. 
• 51% of all home fire deaths occurred in fires between 11:00PM and 
7:00AM. 
• 7% of residential structure fires are initiated in the bedroom. 
• One of every 41 bedroom fires resulted in occupant fatality and one of 
every 10 resulted in occupant injury.   
Severity of Residential Structure Fires 
The dangers associated with residential structure fires have been shown to be 
substantial to any human being, as well as those in specific population demographics. 
In the US, from 2007-2011 residential structure fires occurred an average of 366,600 
times per year. These fires resulted in a yearly average of 2,570 deaths, 13,210 injuries, 
and $7.2 billion in damage. Residential structure fires can range from being confined to 
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their room to fully engulfing the structure and potentially spreading to neighbouring 
structures. Within the period of 2007-2011, an average of 11,000 fires spread beyond 
their structure of origin each year. While accounting for only 3% of total fire incidents, 
these same fires accounted for almost 14% of all fire related deaths and 15% of all 
property damage from fires (Ahrens, 2013). 
 
Over the past three decades, great progress has been made in reducing the number of 
residential structure fire deaths.  Since 1980, a 52% decrease in total residential 
structure fire deaths has occurred in the US.  While impressive, the number of 
residential structure fire deaths per 1,000 fires has shown little trend of decreasing 
(Ahrens, 2013). Further details of these trends can be seen in Figures 23 and 24. 
 
Figure 23 - US Residential Structure Fire Deaths, by Year: 1980-2011 (Aherns, 2013) 
 
Figure 24 - US Residential Structure Fire Deaths per Thousand Reported Fires, by Year: 1980-2011 (Aherns, 2013) 
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These trends indicate that while great progress has been made in preventing residential 
structure fires throughout the past three decades, fires continue to remain just as deadly 
when they do occur. 
Common Fire Prevention Techniques  
While most people think of dealing with fire with reactive measures, there exists a 
multitude of different techniques to confront fire proactively. These measures focus on 
reducing the likelihood of a fire occurrence.  A primary method utilized by the world’s 
governments is through legislative action.  Codes, standards and laws all act to 
illegalize activities that would likely cause a fire to ignite. Product safety regulations are 
also an important tool in fire prevention.  The Underwriter’s Laboratory (UL) is a safety 
science company that works to provide life safety globally.  In reference to fire safety 
measures, UL says “We target prevention and detection by helping develop new 
technologies, processes and training” (Fire Safety, 2014). In addition to testing, 
companies, governments, and other organizations seek to reduce the chance of fire 
incidents through public education.  Public education can be defined as “comprehensive 
community fire and injury prevention programs designed to eliminate or mitigate 
situations that endanger lives” (NFPA 1035, 2000). A common theme of fire safety 
education programs is educating the public about residential structure fire causes, 
demographics subject to elevated risk, and the cost to life and property of a fire. These 
themes are only some examples of the information that public education campaigns can 
provide people in order to reduce both the potential and impact of residential structure 
fires. 
Common Operational Response to Fires  
When preventative measures fail, fires often spread enough to require the involvement 
of fire departments. The three main goals of any firefighting operation are in order: 
1. to ensure life safety of building occupants, firefighters and bystanders  
2. to extinguish the fire 
3. to conserve property 
 
The primary method of ensuring life safety to building inhabitants is search and rescue 
operations. Fire departments perform search and rescue operations by having sufficient 
personnel to begin search and rescue while simultaneously initiating extinguishment 
procedures. Fire extinguishment can follow two strategies, offensive and defensive. 
Offensive fire extinguishment consists of attacking the interior of a structure by applying 
a sufficient quantity of water to the fuel load to suppress and subsequently extinguish 
the fire.  Defensive extinguishment entails attacking the exterior of a structure in order to 
contain a fire. Offensive fire extinguishment presents a much greater risk and therefore 
is typically used when lives are in danger, whereas defensive extinguishment is used 
when no lives are endangered.  The final goal of fire department operations is to 
conserve property. The primary way to achieve this goal is through a process called 
overhauling. Overhauling consists of ensuring that the fire is completely extinguished. 
Overhaul is accomplished by inspecting walls, ceilings, and other structural components 
for any lingering embers or flames (Cote, 2008). 
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Appendix C: MFB Operational Rankings106 
 
  
                                            
106 About Us, MFB Website, Accessed 2/05/14, http://mfb.staging.reactive.com/About-Us/Our-People/Ranks.html 
Recruit Firefighter, Level 1 
Firefighter, Level 2 
Firefighter, Level 3 
Senior Firefighter 
Qualified Firefighter 
Qualified Firefighter with Leading Firefighter Qualifications 
Leading Firefighter 
Station Officer 
Senior Station Officer 
Commander 
Assistant Chief Fire Officer 
Deputy Chief Fire Officer 
Chief Fire Officer 
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Appendix D: Coverage of Other Victorian Fire Services 
A map of all of Victoria is located in Figure 25. MFB’s coverage area is highlighted in 
grey. While the coverage area of MFB is smaller than CFA, MFB protects close to four 
million residents within that area.107 By comparison, CFA protects approximately 3.3 
million residents.108 
 
Figure 25 - CFA Coverage Map 
As has been mentioned before, DEPI’s primary goal is the protection of the 
environment, and their firefighting services are focused upon protecting public lands in 
the areas shown in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26 - DEPI Coverage Map  
                                            
107 MFB Annual Report, 2012-13, Page 6 
108 CFA Annual Report, 2011-12, Page 5 
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Appendix E: Process of Campaign Evaluation 
To realize the effectiveness and increase the success of a campaign, an evaluation 
should take place in which the various aspects and details of the campaign can be 
analyzed. Barnard and Parker (2012) write that analysis “helps provide the knowledge, 
understanding and awareness necessary to craft a relevant and compelling narrative 
and then inform the activities of the campaign” (p. 62). This is however, not easily 
accomplished. Hornik and Yanovitzky (2003) summarize the difficulty of evaluating fire 
safety programs well saying, 
 
Decisions about the standards against which to measure campaign success, 
strategies for separating campaign effects on outcomes from those of other 
sources of influence, and expectations for differential campaign effects across 
subpopulations are only a few examples of the complexity faced by researchers 
who seek to evaluate communication campaigns (p.1). 
 
According to Cote (2008), “professional program evaluators have developed a staged 
approach to evaluation” to confront these difficulties. The steps in the approach are as 
follows (p. 5-120): 
1. Formative Evaluation 
2. Process Evaluation 
3. Impact Evaluation 
4. Outcome Evaluation 
 
These four separate processes analyse all aspects of a campaign in order to provide a 
clear measure of success. 
Formative Evaluation 
During the beginning stages of a campaign when a plan is being created, a formative 
evaluation should be conducted to assess of all the aspects that will be utilized 
throughout the entire process of the program. Becoming familiarized with the audience 
and other external factors can contribute to a campaign that will be more successful. As 
mentioned previously, there are several basic elements to a campaign, and these 
should be given careful thought in the earliest of stages. Analysing these elements is 
part of the formative evaluation. Cote (2008) defines this as “The process of testing 
program plans, messages, materials, strategies, and activities for feasibility, 
appropriateness, acceptability and applicability” (p.5-120). 
 
When beginning with an objective, it must be clear and understandable, as must the 
message being conveyed (“How to run a campaign,” 2013). FEMA suggests particularly 
for fire safety education programs to analyse risk within the community first, including 
existing common fire safety problems as well as the demographic features of the 
situation and those involved (“Public Fire Education Planning: A Five Step Process”, 
2008). Knowing the current state of the issue gives an idea of what the message should 
include and how to support it. This allows for an implementation strategy to be created 
(“Public Fire Education Planning: A Five Step Process”, 2008). An informative and 
evocative title should be chosen keeping in mind the audience and the goals (“How to 
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run a campaign,” 2013). Both selecting and truly understanding the audience are crucial 
steps. Without the audience, change cannot happen (Barnard & Parker, 2012). 
 
Messages and media types are dependent upon who is on the receiving end of them, 
and a good understanding of the audience can help organizations recognize how to 
effectively communicate with them (Barnard & Parker, 2012). Timing of the program and 
geography are also things to consider. Whether other campaigns are running 
simultaneously, there is time sensitive information involved, or there is a particular 
season in which the campaign may be more relevant, timing should be taken into 
account (“How to run a campaign,” 2013). Both geographical reach and demographics 
of particular areas also lend to an understanding of the audience (“How to run a 
campaign,” 2013). Looking at all of these factors as well as particular factors to specific 
campaigns or scenarios is a pre-emptive action that can allow a campaign to be more 
successful from the start. While recommended at the onset of a campaign this 
evaluation is also possible for existing campaigns.  In the case of the evaluation of the 
HFSC, the formative evaluation examines an existing campaign’s materials and 
strategies for effectiveness, in order to provide an improved future implementation of the 
campaign. 
Process Evaluation 
After the above content of a campaign has been optimized, it is useful to examine the 
actual distribution of this content. The manner by which this occurs is called process 
evaluation. According to Cote, process evaluation is defined as “The mechanism of 
testing whether a program is reaching the target population, such as by counting the 
number of people or households reached” (p. 5-120). This process is completed by 
surveying those in the target population. The surveys during a process evaluation are 
strictly for evaluating the means by which content is dispersed.  The goal of the process 
evaluation is only to determine whether or not the methods of distribution are adequate 
to reach the target population. 
 
An example of process evaluation is one already completed by the MFB through 
Mitchell, a third party advertising agency. This evaluation broke down the most recent 
2013 Home Fire Safety Campaign into radio, outdoor, print media, and digital media 
advertising. The target population was split into two age demographics, those aged 18+ 
and those aged 65+. As has been previously mentioned, those aged 65+ have 
increased vulnerability to harm from home fire incidents and as such were an important 
group of the target population for the campaign. Each individual media type was 
analysed by determining the per cent of the population that had either heard or seen the 
corresponding advertisements. Mitchell’s evaluation also included the portion of the 
budget spent on each individual advertising section. 
Impact Evaluation  
Once it is determined that the content of the campaign is both appropriate and being 
efficiently dispersed to the target audience, a campaign has to be evaluated in its 
capability to change the behaviour of the target population.  This process deemed 
impact evaluation is defined as “The mechanism of measuring changes in the target 
population’s knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, or behaviours associated with the program” 
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(p. 5-120). This process encounters the difficulty of influencing behaviour change in the 
evaluation of fire safety, or any other public education campaigns. 
 
A campaign’s communication strategy is often designed in a way that will be received 
well by the audience. If one of the objectives of the campaign is for this information to 
influence the behaviour of the audience, then simply quantitatively evaluating how many 
people were reached is not sufficient (McLoughlin, 1982). Behavioural change is a 
complex subject and with regards to campaigning is often difficult to evaluate due to the 
multitudinous factors that can affect the behaviour an individual chooses to demonstrate 
(Hornik & Yanovitzky, 2003).Understanding why people choose to carry out their actions 
is a difficult task on its own, and determining if a campaign had any substantial 
contribution to this decision is particularly difficult. Hornik and Yanovitsky (2003) provide 
a useful graphic to show a general mapping of behavioral results following exposure to 
a campaigns message that can be seen in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27 - Behaviorial Change Mapping (Hornik & Yanovitsky, 2003) 
Behavioral models are often used to better understand the way in which people behave. 
According to Cote (2008), there exists three behavioral frameworks for use in 
community education. The frameworks are summarized in Table 8 (p. 5-122): 
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Table 8 - Behavioral Frameworks (Cote, 2008) 
Framework Summary 
Health Belief Model Based on the assumptions that an individual will readily alter behavior 
based on:  
• Perception of a threat 
• Perceived severity of threat 
• Perceived benefit of altered action 
• Perceived barriers or personal costs of action 
Social Learning Theory Based on assumptions that behavior change is a social process and that it 
is influenced by active involvement in the learning process and identified 
consequences of change (or lack thereof) 
PRECEDE Model Predisposing, Reinforcing, and Enabling constructs work together toward 
inciting a change in behavior 
In 2006-2007, the Scottish Executive ran a fire safety campaign entitled “Don’t Give Fire 
a Home” ("Fire Safety Campaign 2006/07," 2007 ). To evaluate the behavior of the 
community resulting from the campaign, the Scottish Executive completed a 
subsequent impact evaluation of the campaign. Examples of the impact guided 
questions asked in the evaluation can be seen below in Table 9. 
Table 9 - Impact Evaluation Questionnaire (Fire Safety Campaign 2006/07,2007) 
 
 
In addition to the examples from Table 9, the Scottish Executive also interviewed 
respondents in terms of their attitudes towards fire safety with the following statements 
("Fire Safety Campaign 2006/07," 2007 ): 
• I have never really thought where a fire could happen in my home 
• I am concerned about fire in my home, but I could probably take more 
precautions 
• I sometimes overload electrical plug sockets 
• I rarely think to switch off electrical appliances at the socket when I go out or 
to bed 
• I am very safety conscious at home and make an effort to minimize the risk of 
fire 
• I probably don’t check the battery in the smoke alarm as often as I should 
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Outcome Evaluation 
Once it has been determined what kind of impact the campaign has had on the target 
population, it is time to evaluate how successful the campaign was at completing its 
broad scope goals.  This process, called outcome evaluation, is defined by Cote (2008) 
as “The mechanism of determining how well a program achieves its goal of reducing 
morbidity and mortality; requires a large study population and analysis of the same data 
for a similar population that did not receive the program” (p. 5-120).  As described in the 
definition, a proper outcome evaluation requires an in depth look at fire statistics, across 
a large population. 
 
Outcome evaluation could be considered the most difficult of the four evaluation 
processes. Cote (2008) summarized the difficulties by saying, “It is often not enough to 
show that there was a change in knowledge or behavior or in bottom-line measures, 
such as injuries or dollar loss. One also needs to demonstrate that the observed 
changes were caused by the education program and not by other factors” (p. 5-133). 
Table 10 contains examples of factors that are capable of affecting results from the 
various stages of evaluation (p. 5-134). 
 
 Table 10 - Factors Influencing Program Evaluation (Cote, 2008) 
Uncontrollable Factor 
- Age profile of population 
- Income distribution of population 
- Education level of population 
- Geographical scatter of population 
- Ethnic groups in population 
- Weather or climate change 
- Economic changes 
- Migration of people in or out of community 
- Nature of local business and industry 
- Changes in fire reporting procedures 
Semi-controllable Factor 
- Condition of housing 
- Architecture of new homes 
- Hazards of new technology 
Starting Conditions 
- Severity of fire problem 
- Previous exposures of population to fire safety information 
- Current level of detector usage and condition 
 
These factors must either be addressed or their existence must be acknowledged in 
order to effectively complete the outcome evaluation of a program. One way to address 
these factors is to find a control population, which has had little fire safety education, 
whose characteristics are similar to that of the population under investigation. While this 
is extremely difficult to complete without the initial intention of isolating a control group, it 
is still possible to address some of the larger factors such as weather and economic 
changes. 
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Appendix F: Interview Questions 
QUESTIONS 
• How long have you been involved with the Home Fire Safety Campaign? 
• What was your process/strategy for making the campaign? 
o What was the role of the homefiresafety.com website? 
• Do you think the HFSC is an effective campaign? 
o What were the goals/metrics for success? 
o What were the specific roles of third-party companies such as Mitchell, 
Curie, Enhance, Lote, etc. 
• What state was the HFSC in when you took it over? 
• Is there anything you wanted to see happen in the HFSC that didn’t happen? 
o Anything you’d like to see in future HFSCs? 
o Are there any examples of other campaigns that you like? 
• What is your take on the fact that the budget for Bush Fire Safety is much more 
than the budget for the HFSC? 
o How did you try to get the most out of your money? 
• Why is the home fire safety campaign focused around winter if home fire safety is 
a risk all year round? Why is it in the winter?  
• Why did the HFSC partner with other organizations such as Energy Safe Victoria 
(ESV), AIA (Archicentre) 
o Why did the partnership end? 
• Have there been any new stakeholders?  
MISSING INFO/GAPS: 
• Were the 2009 and 2010 HFSCs evaluated? 
o If so, where would the evaluation be? 
• Campaign Materials 
o 2009 – 1 Print Ad 
o 2010 – 1 Print Ad 
o 2011 – 1 Poster, 3 Print Ads, 1 Radio Ad 
o Anything we’re missing? (Station Kits?) 
MISC. IF TIME ALLOWS: 
• Did you interact with the local community about the campaigns? 
o What do these interactions involve? 
o What sort of people do you talk to? Where? General demographic? 
• Do people seem interested in learning about home fire safety?  
• What do you think are the most effective home fire safety measures? i.e. smoke 
alarms 
• Is there anything you think the public is unaware of or does not know about 
certain aspects of home fire safety? 
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Appendix G: AIRS Data Fields w/ Sample AIRS Data 
 
Table 11 - Sample AIRS Data 
Call Year 2011 
Call Id 110300279 
Call Date 2/03/2011 
Call Time 08:01:48 
Final Incident Type SF 
Type of Incident 111 
Situation Fire damaging structure and contents. 
Y-Posn 2409824 
X-Posn 2489519 
LGA MARIBYRNONG 
Suburb YARRAVILLE 
Activity in Ignition Area 11 
Form of Heat Ignition Heat from electrical equipment arcing, overloaded not classified above. 
Ignition Factor Other electrical failure. 
Area Of Fire Origin Laundry room, area. 
Type of Material First Ignited 63 
Form of Material First Ignited 20 
Equipment Involved in Ignition 930 
Number of Other Persons Injured 0 
Estimated Dollar Loss $7,000 
Extent of Flame Damage 3 
Room of Origin Confined to room of origin. 
Presence of Smoke Alarm 2 
Power Supply of Smoke Alarm 1 
Operation of Smoke Alarm 3 
Effectiveness of Smoke Alarm 1 
Reason of Failure of Smoke Alarm  N/A 
BCA Identifier 21 
Type of Property Use 411 
Type of Owner 300 
Type of Occupant 100 
Type of Action Taken 15 
Alarm Level 1 
Response Time 306 
Turnout Time 95 
Description FIRE INVOLVED A POWER LEAD THAT BECAME OVERHEATED CAUSING 
A FIRE IN A LAUNDRY AREA OF A DWELLING.FIRE WAS CONTAINED BY 
THE OCCUPIER UNTIL THE BRIGADE ARRIVED.DWELLING IS OWNED BY 
THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING. 
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Appendix H: Frequency & Severity Results by Category 
Table 12 - Frequency and Relative Severity by Category 
Season Avg. Relative Severity % of Fires 
Spring 0.98 24.2% 
Summer 1.10 24.5% 
Autumn 0.99 24.9% 
Winter 0.94 26.4% 
   Area of Origin Avg. Relative Severity % of Fires 
Garage 3.39 1.8% 
Bedroom 2.43 8.1% 
Living 1.68 8.4% 
Structural 1.43 11.4% 
Facilities 1.20 4.6% 
Outside 1.51 4.2% 
Storage 1.59 1.7% 
Connecting 0.77 3.5% 
Kitchen 0.39 49.7% 
Utility 0.34 5.1% 
Other 1.60 1.0% 
Unknown 7.27 0.5% 
   Cause Avg. Relative Severity % of Fires 
Cooking 0.26 36.1% 
Impaired 1.11 1.9% 
Improper Use 1.48 12.2% 
Mechanical Failure 0.98 36.0% 
Not Paying Attention 1.56 4.2% 
Other 1.92 5.2% 
Unknown 4.25 4.4% 
   Source of Energy Avg. Relative Severity % of Fires 
Cigarette 1.46 7.0% 
Electrical 0.83 52.2% 
Gas 0.55 23.9% 
Open Flame 1.91 5.6% 
Other 2.36 3.6% 
Unknown 1.83 7.7% 
   Appliance Avg. Relative Severity % of Fires 
Stove 0.34 27.4% 
Cigarette 1.46 7.1% 
Heater 0.89 6.8% 
Oven 0.16 6.0% 
Electric Infrastructure 1.11 8.9% 
Light 0.89 4.3% 
Toaster 0.14 3.0% 
Microwave 0.07 2.9% 
Candle 2.18 2.2% 
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Fan 0.95 2.1% 
Unknown 2.68 9.4% 
Other 1.35 20.0% 
      
Presence of Smoke Detector Avg. Relative Severity % of Fires 
Not Present/Failed to Operate 1.55 18.8% 
Operated 0.80 45.7% 
Other (Too Small, Etc) 0.97 35.4% 
   Time of Day Avg. Relative Severity % of Fires 
Night (23:00-06:59) 1.66 16.1% 
Morning (07:00-14:59) 0.97 33.4% 
Evening (15:00-22:59) 0.81 50.4% 
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Appendix I: Internal Comparison of Severity Criteria 
 
The team compared the three severity criteria amongst one another to ensure that a 
severe fire in one criterion indicated a severe fire in another criterion.  
 
 
Figure 28 – Comparison of Severity Indicators 
Figure 28 shows that there was a high level of internal consistency between each of the 
three measures of severity. Fires of more than one alarm are more common the further 
they spread from their object of origin. Additionally, the greater the extent of flame 
damage, the higher the average estimated dollar loss per incident. Finally as fires 
increase in average dollar loss, the likelihood of it being greater than a one alarm fire 
increases.  
 
One outlier to this trend are fires extending beyond the structure of origin with an 
average cost being less than fires contained to the structure of origin. One explanation 
for this could be that a fire that extends past the structure of origin does not necessarily 
indicate a more severe fire. For example, a fire started in a kitchen that spreads through 
a window and impinges on a neighbouring fence has extended beyond the structure of 
origin. This would be the case regardless of whether or not the fire was otherwise 
contained to the kitchen. The same fire, had it not impinged upon the fence, would be 
classified as confined to room of origin. 
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The average cost per incident shown in Figure 28 excludes the lowest and highest five 
per cent of estimated dollar loss figures. This was done to remove outliers, particularly 
in the very high dollar loss figures, as some of these appeared to be errors in the AIRS 
data where fires had extremely high estimated losses relative to other indicators of 
severity. The median values for estimated dollar loss were also calculated, and followed 
the same trend as the average. These values as well as a comparison between the 
average and 90 per cent average can be seen in Table 13. 
 
Table 13 - Average Cost per Incident vs. 90% Cost per Incident 
Extent of Flame Damage Average Middle 90% % Diff Median 
Confined to object of origin. $1,572 $354 77% $100 
Confined to part of room or area of origin. $10,624 $7,433 30% $2,200 
Confined to room of origin. $26,003 $20,122 23% $10,000 
Confined to the floor of origin. $107,837 $91,037 16% $65,000 
Confined to structure of origin. $155,404 $130,259 16% $80,000 
Extended beyond structure of origin. $153,023 $121,562 21% $60,000 
 
Over 90% of all fires estimated to cause less than $10,000 of damage were fires which 
were contained to the room of origin, while over 78% of all fires causing greater than 
$100,000 in damage spread past the room of origin. Fires causing damage between 
$50,000 and $100,000 were relatively evenly distributed between containment to room 
of origin and spreading beyond room of origin with 46.9% and 53.1% respectively. This 
indicates that the further fires spread from their object of origin, the more monetary 
damage they caused. This trend is displayed in more detail in Figure 29.  
 
 
Figure 29 - Extent of Flame Damage vs. Estimated Dollar Loss 
99.3% 98.6% 96.6% 92.1% 80.4% 53.1% 22.0% 8.1% 18.0% 12.5% 
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0%10%20%
30%40%50%
60%70%80%
90%100%
Extent of Flame Damage vs. Estimated 
Dollar Loss 
Confined to room of origin Spread past room of origin
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Approximately 85.2% of one alarm fires were estimated to have caused less than 
$5,000 of damage. More than 90% of all two, three, and four alarm fires caused 
damages estimated above $5,000. Therefore an increasing alarm level was also found 
to indicate a more severe fire in terms of estimated dollar loss. Further information is 
located in Figure 30. 
 
 
Figure 30- Alarm Level vs. Estimated Dollar Loss 
 Over 96% of all one alarm fires were contained to the room of origin. Fires that 
spread beyond the room of origin comprised 71% of all two alarm fires, 75% of all three 
alarm fires and 100% of all four alarm fires. This indicates that a fire deemed severe 
with regards to alarm level can also be deemed severe with regards to extent of flame 
damage. This distribution is displayed in more depth in Figure 31.  
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Figure 31 - Alarm Level vs. Extent of Flame Damage 
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Appendix J: 2009-2013 HFSC Analysis 
 
Table 14 - Preliminary HFSC Analysis 
Campaign 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Budget $173,802.80 $183,000.00 $156,620.31 $254,495.20 $187,727.49 
Duration 31/05 - 26/07 23/05 - 31/08 01/06 - 31/08 27/05 -1/09 31/05 - 31/08 
Target Demo's 
Families Families Familes Families 25-54 People who cook 
Elderly Elderly Elderly (55+) Aged (65+) Aged (65+) 
CALD CALD Firefighters Males 18-34 Males 18-45 
Lower Economic         
Partners CFA/ESV CFA/ESV/AIA CFA/ESV/AIA CFA CFA 
3rd Party 
Involvement 
Mitchell Mitchell Mitchell Mitchell Mitchell 
HB Advertising   Currie Currie Haystac 
    LOTE LOTE LOTE 
Main Theme(s) Fire Safety Cooking Danger 
Be Vigilant (Fire 
Warden) 
Personal 
Responsibility 
Personal 
Responsibility 
Evalulation? No Yes (Enhance) Yes (Enhance) Yes (Wallis) Yes (Wallis) 
 
Table 15 - Evaluation of the 2010 and 2011 HFSC by Enhance Research 
Prompted Awareness of Campaign 
2010 2011 
Radio (1 ad) 28% TV 51% 
Editorials 24% Radio (2 ads) 24%/25% 
Poster 9% Print 20% 
Spontaneous Message Take-out 
2010 2011 
Being aware of fire hazards/practising 
fire safety 42% 
Dangers of distractions when using 
appliances 58% 
Ensure house is fire ready/safety plans 
for households 21% 
Being aware of fire 
hazards/practising fire safety 36% 
Smoke alarms in working order 17% 
Care when dealing with 
fires/flammables 15% 
Actions Taken 
2010 2011 
Tested Smoke Alarms 56% Tested Smoke Alarms 46% 
Extra care to minimise distractions  45% Extra care to minimise distractions  47% 
Talked to family and friends 29% Talked to family and friends 20% 
Visited Fire Safety Website 11% Visited Fire Safety Website 9% 
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Table 16 - Evaluation of the 2012 and 2013 HFSC by Wallis 
Result 
Did it because 
they saw/heard 
a message 
Did it, not 
because they 
saw/heard a 
message 
Did activity, did 
not see/hear 
any message 
Action 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 
Tested smoke alarm 8% 11% 6% 13% 30% 34% 
Checked electrical appliance 6% 3% 4% 4% 21% 10% 
Planned escape 6% 2% 3% 4% 17% 5% 
Talked with friends/family 6% 2% 4% 2% 13% 3% 
Had heating serviced 4% 3% 4% 3% 12% 9% 
Started using fire screen  3% n/a 2% n/a 2% n/a 
Practised Escape 3% 2% 3% 0% 8% 1% 
Improve cooking safety  3% 4% 3% 4% 3% 6% 
Completed Checklist 3% 2% 1% 1% 9% 3% 
Bought a fire blanket 2% 1% 2% 0% 6% 3% 
Visited website 1% 1% 1% 0% 3% 1% 
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Appendix K: 2009-2013 Home Fire Safety Campaign Media 
 
Figure 32 –A 2009 HFSC Advertisement in the Herald Sun Newspaper 
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Figure 33 - A 2011 HFSC Poster 
 
Figure 34 - Two 2011 HFSC Advertisements in the Melbourne Senior Services Newspaper 
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Figure 35 - A 2012 HFSC Advertisement in Regional Newspapers 
 
Figure 36 - A 2013 HFSC Advertisement in Regional Newspapers 
 
Figure 37 - A 2013 HFSC Online Advertisement 
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Appendix L: Statistical Significance Calculations 
To determine the statistical significance of the variation between the seasons, the p-
value was found using the chi-squared value. The chi squared value was found using 
the following formula: 
𝑋2 = � (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 −  𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)2
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  
The expected value was chosen to be an exactly 25 per cent split between the seasons. 
The exact values can be seen in Table 17 and Table 18. 
 
Table 17 - Values Used in Chi-Squared Test for 2008-2013 
Season Expected Observed Month Expected Observed Month Expected Observed 
Spring 2528 2451 January 842.7 851 July 842.7 871 
Summer 2528 2474 February 842.7 763 August 842.7 885 
Autumn 2528 2520 March 842.7 835 September 842.7 841 
Winter 2528 2667 April 842.7 783 October 842.7 813 
   May 842.7 902 November 842.7 797 
   June 842.7 911 December 842.7 860 
2008-2013 
The chi squared value was calculated to be 11.167 for seasonal variance and 28.586 
for monthly variance. This resulted in an associated p-value of .01086 and .00263 
respectively. In other words, it can be said with 98-99 per cent confidence that the 
observed differences in the seasons were insignificant and above 99 per cent 
confidence that the monthly variations were as well. 
 
Table 18 - Values Used in Chi-Squared Test for 2001-2013 
Season Expected Observed Month Expected Observed Month Expected Observed 
Spring 4814.5 4773 January 1604.8  July 1604.8  
Summer 4814.5 4669 February 1604.8  August 1604.8  
Autumn 4814.5 4755 March 1604.8  September 1604.8  
Winter 4814.5 5061 April 1604.8  October 1604.8  
   May 1604.8  November 1604.8  
   June 1604.8  December 1604.8  
    
2001-2013 
The chi squared value was calculated to be 18.111 for seasonal variance and 40.880 
for monthly variance. This resulted in an associated p-value of .0004 and .000003 
respectively. In other words, it can be said with over 99 per cent confidence that the 
observed variation is insignificant for both months and seasons. 
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